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 Abstract 
Recent neuroscientific research has begun to explore the neural mechanisms of social behavior, 
ranging from more basic processes, such as social learning, to more complex social decisions, 
such as moral judgments. While these studies provided valuable insights into some of the 
relevant mechanisms, important issues have remained unaddressed. For instance, some of the 
formal learning principles have not been explored in the social domain. Further, it is not clear 
how different brain regions communicate with each other during moral decision making. Most 
importantly, how can individual differences in behavior and disposition prove useful in 
addressing these questions? The dissertation consists of three studies that aimed to close these 
gaps.  
The first study investigated whether an efficient learning principle, which applies to 
individual learning, also applies to social learning. This principle is expressed by the blocking 
effect that refers to the phenomenon that a novel stimulus is blocked from learning when it is 
associated with a fully predicted outcome. I employed a social variant of the blocking paradigm 
and used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to address the question whether the 
blocking effect manifests itself when individuals learn about others’ rewards in a social context. 
I demonstrate that blocking does indeed occur in the social domain and it does so to a similar 
degree as in the individual domain. On the neural level, individual differences in the degree of 
social blocking relate specifically to activations in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Thus, 
while the same efficiency principle applies to reward learning in the individual and social 
domain, the mPFC plays a central role in implementing it specifically during social learning. 
The second study investigated circumstances that prevent the blocking effect and instead 
lead to learning. Previous research on individual learning has shown that a change in both the 
value and the identity of a reward results in unblocking, that is learning, rather than blocking. I 
examined whether and how this would occur in a social context and employed a social variant 
of the unblocking experiment to assess learning driven by changes in the reward recipient. I 
found that participants who normally block redundant learning in the standard blocking 
paradigm show unblocking when the reward recipient changes. Moreover, the degree of 
recipient-specific unblocking was higher in less empathic and less prosocial participants. This 
suggests that value-matched learning is sensitive to the reward recipient and that individual 
differences in unblocking may relate to social traits. 
In the third study I examined how individual differences in moral disposition influence 
behavior and neural correlates during decisions concerning honesty. Specifically, I used fMRI 
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 to study the influence of “protected values”, which supposedly shield moral decisions against 
economic considerations, when honesty is economically costly. With increasing economic costs 
I find that participants show stronger activation in the dorsolateral (dlPFC) and dorsomedial 
(dmPFC) prefrontal cortex the more honest they are. Importantly, functional connectivity 
between these regions and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) was stronger in high cost conditions 
compared with low cost conditions in participants with high protected values, suggesting the 
involvement of control mechanisms. Furthermore, the relation between cost-dependent dlPFC-
IFG connectivity and protected values was specific for moral decisions as compared with non-
moral decisions. These findings provide novel insights into how prefrontal connectivity predicts 
individual variability in honesty and stress the importance of investigating individual differences 
in functional connectivity related to moral decision making. 
In summary, the result of the studies presented in this thesis show how individual 
differences in behavior and disposition can help to achieve a more comprehensive understanding 
of the behavioral and neural underpinnings in social learning and moral decision making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 List of manuscripts 
The dissertation is based on the following research articles: 
 
Study 1: 
Seid-Fatemi A, Tobler PN (2014). Efficient learning mechanisms hold in the social domain and 
are implemented in the medial prefrontal cortex. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. Advance online 
publication. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsu130. 
 
Study 2: 
Seid-Fatemi A, Tobler PN. Social unblocking. In preparation. 
 
Study 3: 
Seid-Fatemi A, Heise F, Tanner C, Gibson R, Wagner AF, Tobler PN. Prefrontal connectivity 
predicts individual differences in honesty. In preparation. 
 
 
  
iv 
 
 Contents  
1 General Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Reward and reinforcement learning .............................................................................. 2 
1.2 Blocking and unblocking .............................................................................................. 3 
1.3 Neural representations of reward and reinforcement learning ...................................... 5 
1.4 Neural correlates underlying social learning ................................................................. 6 
1.5 Moral decisions and individual differences .................................................................. 7 
1.6 Neural mechanisms underlying decisions concerning honesty ..................................... 8 
2 Overview of the studies ................................................................................................ 10 
2.1 Study 1: Neural correlates of efficient learning mechanisms in the social domain .... 10 
2.2 Study 2: Social unblocking ......................................................................................... 13 
2.3 Study 3: Brain connectivity and individual differences in honesty ............................ 15 
3 General Discussion ....................................................................................................... 19 
3.1 Study 1 ........................................................................................................................ 19 
3.2 Study 2 ........................................................................................................................ 20 
3.3 Study 3 ........................................................................................................................ 22 
3.4 General Conclusions ................................................................................................... 24 
References ................................................................................................................................ 26 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 36 
A Appendix to Study 1.................................................................................................... 37 
B Appendix to Study 2.................................................................................................... 50 
C Appendix to Study 3.................................................................................................... 69 
 
iv 
 
General Introduction 
1 General Introduction 
For humans, as for many other species, effective functioning strongly depends on social 
cognition: the ability to encode and process information about others and to use these 
representations to guide behavior in a social environment. The basis of social cognition is social 
learning, which refers to the acquisition of social information or social behavior. More is known 
about non-social than social learning, which is surprising given the importance of social learning. 
I wondered whether social learning relies on similar learning mechanisms as non-social learning. 
Recent neuroscientific research has assumed so and therefore extended formal models of 
learning to the social domain to describe the mechanisms and neural underpinnings that underlie 
social learning. On a more complex level, social cognition encompasses decisions that relate to 
social norms and have social consequences. Moral decisions represent such a high-level social 
cognitive process and are based on judgments of the appropriateness of one’s behavior within 
the context of socialized perceptions of right and wrong. As these kinds of decisions regulate 
crucial aspects of our social life, a clear understanding of the neurobiological processes is of 
critical importance. 
In this dissertation, I present three studies (see appendix) that investigate the behavioral 
and neural mechanisms of social learning and moral decisions making, particularly with respect 
to individual differences. Study 1 investigates whether an optimality principle, which applies to 
individual learning and is expressed by the so-called blocking effect, also applies to social 
learning and how individual differences in behavior influence the neural representations of this 
effect. Study 2 examines in what circumstances this principle no longer holds (leading to an 
unblocking effect) during social learning and how this relates to individual differences in social 
traits. Study 3 explores how moral decisions concerning honesty are represented in the brain and 
how connectivity patterns in prefrontal regions change in relation to individual differences in 
honesty. 
In the introductory chapter, I will summarize the theoretical background of 
reinforcement learning in the individual and social domain, as well previous findings on the 
neurobiology of learning. Next, I give an overview of moral decision making in the context of 
honesty and describe previous research on the underlying neural processes. The three studies 
will be summarized in the second chapter. Finally, a general discussion and conclusion form the 
third chapter. 
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General Introduction 
1.1  Reward and reinforcement learning 
Learning to associate environmental stimuli with beneficial or aversive outcomes is 
fundamentally important as it allows predicting biologically relevant events. Predictions about 
future events, in turn, may help the individual to prepare actions before these events actually 
occur. Such preparatory mechanisms enable rapid execution of appropriate responses, which can 
provide an adaptive advantage over competitors. 
The formation of cue-outcome associations in humans and animals was first studied by 
Ivan Pavlov in the nineteenth century (Pavlov, 1927). In his classic experiment Pavlov observed 
that experienced dogs started salivating before food was actually delivered and that this response 
could be induced when a bell was rung to indicate that the food was ready. Through this 
observation the principles of classical (or Pavlovian) conditioning emerged. A biologically 
relevant unconditioned stimulus (US) such as food, elicits an unconditioned response (UR; 
salivation). When a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS; the bell) repeatedly precedes the US, the 
CS will eventually also cause the dog to salivate (conditioned response, or CR), suggesting that 
the animal has formed an association between the presentation of the CS and the delivery of the 
US. In contrast to classical conditioning, instrumental (or operant) conditioning describes the 
procedure of how animals learn to perform a behavior that leads to a rewarding outcome. This 
relationship between behavior and reinforcement was first described by Thorndike (Thorndike, 
1911) as “the law of effect”, which states that the probability with which animals show a 
particular behavior increases with the probability of the behavior leading to a positive 
reinforcement and decreases with the probability of the behavior leading to a punishment. Thus, 
both types of learning are driven by the formation of associations between the representations of 
the cue or a behavioral reaction and the reinforcer. 
The mechanisms of reinforcement learning have been formalized using mathematical 
models. The key idea of these models is the notion of surprise that drives learning, which was 
first formalized by Bush and Mosteller (1951). This earlier model was later extended by Rescorla 
and Wagner (1972) and in its core still today represents the most influential theoretical model of 
associative learning. The Rescorla-Wagner (RW) model describes the learning process in terms 
of the changes in the strength of association between CS and US. The basic assumption is that 
the change in associative strength ∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 at trial t would be represented by: 
∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼(𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 − Σ𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡) 
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Here, 𝜆𝜆 is the actual outcome on a given trial, Σ𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡  the predicted outcome of all stimuli presented, 
and 𝛼𝛼  is the learning rate. The change in associative strength is driven by the discrepancy 
between the expected and actual outcome. This difference is termed the prediction error and is 
thought to act as a teaching signal that updates the value of the CS. On each trial, the associative 
strength 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡, reflecting the cumulative information from all previous trials, is updated with the 
change in associative strength ∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 in the current trial: 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 + ∆𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡  
During learning, when the cue-outcome association is newly introduced, the prediction error is 
large and the associative strength will increase. Over the course of learning, the prediction error 
will become smaller, and thus the increase in associative strength will also decrease with each 
trial. Once the outcome is fully predicted, the prediction error will be zero and the associative 
strength will stay constant as long as the outcome remains unchanged. This happens when 
learning is complete and has reached an asymptote. The 𝛼𝛼 term reflects the learning rate and 
determines how much weight is given to recent experience as captured by the prediction error. 
Thus, the free parameter characterizes how quickly the asymptote is reached. 
Although the RW model explains a variety of behaviorally observed associative learning 
phenomena, it also has some limitations. For example, it cannot account for within-trial effects 
such as second-order conditioning or sensitivity to stimulus timing. Therefore, more recently the 
temporal difference (TD) learning model and Q-learning have been introduced as real-time 
extensions of the RW model that respectively capture classical and instrumental conditioning. 
These newer models assume that prediction errors are computed at any given moment, both 
during and in-between trials rather than just at the end of a trial (Sutton and Barto, 1990; Watkins 
and Dayan, 1992).  
1.2  Blocking and unblocking 
Although learning is essential for adaptive and goal-directed behavior, it is also costly and 
requires the use of limited cognitive resources. These resources could be conserved if we 
prevented learning whenever little or no new information is available. Thus, it would be more 
efficient if learning only took place when necessary, that is, when previous learning did not make 
it superfluous. For example, it is efficient not to learn a second cause when a first cause already 
fully explains an effect (outcome). Associative learning research calls this the “blocking effect” 
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(Kamin, 1969) because the previously learned association “blocks” learning about a concurrently 
appearing novel stimulus. The underlying rationale is that learning to predict an outcome on the 
basis of a novel stimulus is redundant if we can already do so on the basis of a previously learned 
stimulus.  
For instance, assume that Pavlov’s dog has learned the association between the bell and 
the delivery of food and shows a salivating response when presented with the bell. In the next 
stage, a light is presented in combination with the bell, and both are followed by food. If the light 
cue is now presented alone, it would not elicit a salivating response. This can be explained by 
the fact that the food is already fully predicted by the presentation of the bell. As the light 
provides only redundant information, learning does not occur. Previous learning about the bell 
has blocked the formation of an association between the light and the reward. By contrast, if the 
light would appear concurrently with a stimulus that does not predict the reward, then learning 
about the light is not redundant and blocking does not occur. Blocking of novel learning has 
been observed in different species including rats (Kamin, 1969), monkeys (Waelti et al., 2001), 
and humans (Tobler et al., 2006; Prados, 2011; Eippert et al., 2012), who show inter-individual 
variability in the degree to which this effect occurs (Tobler et al., 2006; Byrom, 2013). 
Blocking can be prevented if the value (but not the identity) or the identity (but not the 
value) of the outcomes is changed. In order to show this “unblocking effect”, a variation of the 
blocking paradigm is used in which the compound of the first and second cue is followed by a 
different quantity (Holland, 1984) or different identity (Rescorla, 1999) of the outcome than the 
quantity or identity predicted by the first cue. For example, imagine that Pavlov’s dog has learned 
the association between the bell and the delivery of two food pellets. If in the next stage, a light 
is presented in combination with the bell and the compound of the two stimuli is followed by 
two pellets, the light cue would be blocked from learning, as described above. However, if the 
bell-and-light compound would be followed by one or three pellets, blocking would be prevented 
and the light cue would be learned. This is because the light cue provides new, non-redundant 
information about the quantity or value of the food, which is useful to adapt responding. Thus, 
in contrast to blocking, changing the value of the outcome results in learning of the second cue 
due to the discrepancy between expected and obtained value.  
By contrast, if the value of two outcomes is held constant and only the identity changes, 
unblocking does not always take place. Evidence for this has come from several studies (Bakal 
et al., 1974; Dickinson and Dearing, 1979; Ganesan and Pearce, 1988) that have shown how 
changing the identity, but not the value of the outcome can result in a similar degree of blocking 
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as keeping identity unchanged. This is the so-called “transreinforcer blocking” phenomenon. To 
illustrate this effect with Pavlov’s dog experiment, it would mean that the light cue would be 
blocked to a similar degree as in the standard blocking paradigm, if its presentation in compound 
with the bell would be followed by, say, two raisins instead of two pellets, a different kind, but 
equally preferred food. This suggests that at least during some types of learning only value, as 
processed by a common motivational system, is relevant for learning, while other features such 
as identity are abstracted away. Transreinforcer blocking and unblocking have been studied in 
rats (Burke et al., 2008; McDannald et al., 2011; Steinberg et al., 2013) and in humans during 
causal learning (Le Pelley et al., 2005).  
1.3  Neural representations of reward and reinforcement learning 
In the last decades a variety of studies investigated the neurobiological mechanisms underlying 
reward processing and reinforcement learning. Single-unit recordings from dopaminergic 
neurons in the monkey ventral tegmental area (VTA) and substantia nigra showed that these 
neurons increase their firing rate to unpredicted rewards (Romo and Schultz, 1990). Subsequent 
studies showed that if the reward was consistently preceded by a cue, after a number of trials the 
dopaminergic response in the VTA and substantia nigra shifted from the time of reward delivery 
to the time of the cue presentation. This response parallels the behaviorally observed conditioned 
response to the cue, which is predictive for reward delivery. Thus, dopaminergic responses to 
rewards depend crucially on the rewards’ unpredictability and reflect not reward per se, but 
reward prediction errors (Schultz et al., 1993, 1997; Schultz, 1998). Similarly, single-unit 
activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been shown to reflect the reward-predictive 
properties of stimuli that precede reward delivery (Schoenbaum et al., 1998; Tremblay and 
Schultz, 1999). 
Subsequent fMRI studies in humans found responses to reward and prediction errors in 
regions to which dopamine neurons project. These studies have identified the striatum and the 
OFC in the context of primary rewards (Berns et al., 2001; O’Doherty et al., 2002, 2003; 
McClure et al., 2003) and secondary rewards such as money (Knutson et al., 2001a, 2001b; 
O’Doherty et al., 2001; Elliott et al., 2003). Further research has shown that signals in the 
striatum and the OFC comply with principles of formal learning theory and can explain 
conditioning effects in individual learning such as the blocking phenomenon (Tobler et al., 
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2006). More specifically, both regions have been found to show lower responses to blocked as 
compared with non-blocked, reward-predicting stimuli. 
1.4  Neural correlates underlying social learning 
In addition to learning from direct experience, an important factor that guides reward-directed 
behavior is learning from others. Learning by observation is highly functional for an individual 
as it allows for learning without the costs of direct experience (Boyd et al., 2011; Rendell et al., 
2011). Despite the importance of learning by observation the underlying neural mechanisms only 
recently have become the focus of scientific investigations. Several studies have shown that 
observing others receiving rewards activates similar regions that have been implicated in 
processing the direct experience of stimuli and outcomes. For example, one study showed that 
the degree to which individuals found it rewarding to observe others win monetary rewards was 
correlated with increased activity in the ventral striatum that overlapped with activations elicited 
when participants themselves won these rewards (Mobbs et al., 2009). Several further studies 
also suggested that social learning may be represented in the same brain regions that are relevant 
for learning through personal experience. One study investigated prediction errors derived from 
changing the donations for a charity when altruistic choices were made (Kuss et al., 2013). Here, 
reward prediction errors due to outcome changes for the charity elicited responses in the ventral 
striatum, similar to the responses elicited by prediction errors due to changes in the outcome for 
the participants themselves.  
Moreover, receiving social rewards during learning in the form of social feedback 
engages regions, such as the striatum and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that are 
also active during receipt of non-social rewards (Jones et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2012). Similarly, 
observational outcome prediction errors have been found in the vmPFC (Burke et al., 2010), a 
region implicated in processing non-social outcome prediction errors (O’Doherty et al., 2003).  
However, there are also studies suggesting that social learning involves different neural 
structures outside the classic reward system. For example Behrens et al. (2008) investigated 
social learning through advice and found that activations in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 
(dmPFC) and superior temporal sulcus regions within the temporoparietal junction (STS/TPJ) 
correlated with errors in the predicted trustworthiness of a confederate. Observational action 
prediction error signals, reflecting the actual minus the predicted choice of others, have been 
observed in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC; Burke et al., 2010) and in the dmPFC 
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during learning through simulation (Suzuki et al., 2012). Another study found that while the 
medial PFC tracks the predicted reward given the expected influence the participants’ choices 
have on the partner, the posterior STS was responsible for updating the influence signal by the 
difference between expected and actual influence exerted (Hampton et al., 2008). Thus, there is 
evidence that at least some forms of social learning engage brain areas not commonly involved 
in individual learning but which have been implicated in social cognition (Saxe, 2006; Ruff and 
Fehr, 2014). However, as none of these studies directly compared the social condition with a 
non-social control condition, the question remains open as to whether, and which, of these 
regions represent specific involvement in social learning. 
While these studies provided useful insights into the neural mechanism that are engaged 
in social prediction error processing during learning, the representation and implementation of 
other formal principles during social learning has remained unclear. One important principle is 
that of efficiency. This optimality principle is illustrated by the blocking effect, which has been 
studied so far only when individuals learn about their own outcomes but not when they learn 
about socially relevant outcomes. Moreover, it has yet to be shown whether (and how) this 
efficiency principle would be abolished when individuals learn in a social context. The study of 
social learning is not only relevant because of the high functionality of social learning for reward-
guided behavior but also because it forms the basis for social decisions that involve higher level 
cognitive processes. More specifically, social learning can influence moral decisions that affect 
the outcomes of another individual or of a society as a whole. 
1.5  Moral decisions and individual differences 
Probably one of the most common moral decisions individuals face when interacting with others 
is the decision regarding honesty, which is pervasive not only in everyday situations but also in 
contexts exerting great economic and political impact. How humans think about right and wrong 
in such moral contexts has received attention in many fields, including those of philosophy, 
psychology, economics, and law (Goodenough and Prehn, 2004). Two branches of moral 
philosophy have been most influential in proposing principled answers to this question. 
Utilitarianism (or consequentialism) states that when determining the moral quality of an action 
or principle one should consider solely the foreseen consequences of that action or principle. For 
example, if acting in a certain way maximizes the greater good, that action is morally permissible 
(Mill, 1861). By contrast, deontological (or non-consequentialist) theories argue that it is more 
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important that the action should follow certain rules or principles deemed to be morally valuable 
in themselves. Thus, impermissible actions or principles remain wrong no matter how good their 
consequences are.  
The most influential deontological moral theory has been proposed by Kant, who 
introduced the idea of the categorical imperative, stating that one should act according to maxims 
that could become universal laws (Kant, 1965/1785). A concept that captures deontological 
commitments from a more psychological perspective is that of protected values, which is a 
shorthand for the finding that at least with some moral decisions some individuals refrain from 
making trade-offs about consequences because they apply specific moral principles. These 
principles can be thought of as “protected values” that shield moral decisions against considering 
economic and other consequences (Baron and Spranca, 1997).  
Not surprisingly, moral decisions, such as the ones concerning honesty, vary greatly 
between humans, for example because individuals differ in the extent to which they consider 
consequences in their decisions. These differences emerge to a stronger extent when the cost of 
following the principles (e.g. of telling the truth) is higher. That is, for most individuals the 
benefits of telling the truth will outweigh the costs as long as these costs are low. However, when 
the costs increase, they will become too high for some individuals, while others will stand by 
their moral principles and react less to the costs. 
1.6  Neural mechanisms underlying decisions concerning honesty 
Recent neuroimaging studies identified a network of brain regions that are involved in making 
honest or dishonest decisions (for review see Sip et al., 2008; Abe, 2009). In spite of the variety 
of different experimental paradigms used, such as tasks that involved instructed lying (Spence 
et al., 2001; Ganis et al., 2003; Langleben et al., 2005; Abe et al., 2006) or spontaneous lying 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Greene and Paxton, 2009; Abe and Greene, 2014), the studies 
consistently revealed contributions of the dlPFC, the dmPFC, as well as the ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Most of the studies found these 
regions to be activated when individuals engaged in dishonest behavior, as compared with non-
deceptive control behavior (Sip et al., 2008; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Abe, 2011). Others 
observed these regions to be activated when participants voluntarily told the truth, as compared 
with a control condition in which they had no other choice than telling the truth (Sip et al., 2010), 
particularly in those participants who lied in most trials (Greene and Paxton, 2009). 
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These studies looked primarily at the neural activations underlying honesty in group analyses, 
without directly considering individual differences in the propensity to tell the truth. To date, 
only one study has explored the neural mechanisms underlying individual differences in 
spontaneous dishonest behavior. Abe and Greene (2014) found that individuals exhibiting 
stronger nucleus accumbens responses to anticipated reward show higher levels of dishonest 
behavior and exhibit greater dlPFC activation when refraining from dishonest behavior. While 
this study provides important insights in how the lure of economic incentives influence 
decisions, it is not known how strong moral principles protect against that lure to enable honesty. 
There are different views on how the brain processes moral, as compared to non-moral, 
choices (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Hauser, 2006). It has been argued that moral decision making 
relies on brain processes similar to those seen during non-moral decisions (Greene and Haidt, 
2002; Shenhav and Greene, 2010). This view implies that such judgments are produced by 
domain-general neural mechanisms that underpin both moral and non-moral choices. In contrast, 
it has been hypothesized that moral decisions require dedicated neural processes that are 
specialized for moral behavior (Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007). Accordingly, these processes are 
thought to be distinct from those involved in non-moral decisions and therefore represented by 
a domain-specific moral faculty. It is an open question how individual differences in behavior 
and protected values might relate to a neural activity pattern that is specific to moral as compared 
to non-moral decisions. 
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2 Overview of the studies 
2.1  Study 1: Neural correlates of efficient learning mechanisms in the 
social domain 
Background 
Recent work has extended formal models of individual learning to the social domain and 
investigated social prediction error processing during social learning (Behrens et al. 2008; 
Hampton et al., 2008; Burke et al. 2010; Suzuki et al. 2012). However, the representation and 
implementation of other formal principles during learning in social situations has remained 
unclear. One principle important for optimal learning is that of efficiency and is represented by 
the blocking effect. Blocking of learning occurs when a novel cue is presented together with a 
previously learned cue that predictably leads to the same outcome as the novel cue. Learning 
about the novel cue is blocked because the previously learned cue has already been established 
as a reliable predictor of the outcome. Thus learning about the novel cue would be inefficient 
and redundant. The blocking effect is expressed in a diminished behavioral response to novel 
stimuli that provide only redundant information about reward occurrence, as compared with 
novel stimuli that provide non-redundant information. While blocking is established for 
individual learning, it is not clear how this efficiency principle extends to reward learning in the 
social domain.  
Cues that are redundant for others might nevertheless be of value to us as they may 
provide us with relevant information that is either relevant now or will become relevant later. In 
particular, these cues may enter different associations with rewards for ourselves, as compared 
with rewards for others. Therefore, we might want to keep track of social cues, even if they are 
redundant for others. By extension, whether we still rely on previous learning (resulting in 
blocking) or track all information available to us in the environment (not resulting in blocking) 
remains an open question for reward learning in the social domain. 
If the blocking effect indeed occurred in the social domain, the question arises about 
whether its implementation depends on the same regions that implement it in the individual 
domain. Alternatively, specific regions may be involved in blocking redundant reward learning 
in the social domain that nevertheless implement the blocking effect by following similar 
computational principles. By investigating these possibilities we may be able to illuminate 
whether the neural representations of social learning are unique and different from those of 
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individual learning. To address this question we employed a social variant of the blocking 
paradigm together with fMRI. In particular, we examined the specific role of the mPFC in 
efficient learning about social monetary rewards by investigating individual differences in social 
blocking.  
Methods 
With thirty-eight healthy participants we investigated the blocking effect by using social and 
individual monetary rewards in two separate conditions. Individual rewards were received by 
the participant, social rewards by another person. We used a within-subject version of the 
blocking procedure (Waelti et al., 2001; Tobler et al., 2006) that comprised three consecutive 
phases. In each of these phases, participants were presented with visual stimuli that were 
associated with the delivery of different social or individual outcomes. In the first (pretraining) 
phase, the A (experimental) stimuli (ASOCIAL and AINDIVIDUAL) were paired with a social or 
individual reward. In contrast, the B (control) stimuli (BSOCIAL and BINDIVIDUAL) were not paired 
with a reward. During the presentation of any given stimulus, the participants were to perform a 
specific key press corresponding to the recipient and to the outcome that would follow the 
stimulus. fMRI scanning started in the second (compound conditioning) phase. A stimuli were 
presented together with X stimuli (XSOCIAL and XINDIVIDUAL), forming rewarded compounds. As 
a control, B stimuli were presented together with Y stimuli (YSOCIAL and YINDIVIDUAL) and also 
followed by a reward. In a third phase, X and Y stimuli were presented alone in unrewarded test 
trials. Under the assumption that previous learning blocks subsequent learning, the X stimuli 
should have been blocked from being associated with social or individual reward, while the Y 
stimuli should have been associated with reward. Social and individual reward expectation was 
defined as the percentage of the social and individual reward key pressed, respectively. The 
degree of participant-specific behavioral blocking was calculated as the difference between 
recipient-specific reward key presses for Y stimuli and those for X stimuli. The larger the 
difference, the stronger the blocking effect.  
fMRI data processing and statistical analyses were carried out using statistical parametric 
mapping (SPM8). Data preprocessing consisted of realignment, coregistration, segmentation, 
spatial normalization, and smoothing. Data analysis was performed using a general linear model 
(GLM) approach. The first-level design matrix of each participant included separate regressors 
for each of the four learned stimulus conditions (AINDIVIDUAL, ASOCIAL, BINDIVIDUAL, BSOCIAL) 
modeled at the event-onset time, the compound conditioning trials at the time of the outcome 
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(AXINDIVIDUAL, AXSOCIAL, BYINDIVIDUAL, BYSOCIAL) to capture prediction error-related responses 
during learning, and the four test trial types modeled at the event-onset time (XINDIVIDUAL, 
XSOCIAL, YINDIVIDUAL, YSOCIAL) to capture blocking. We parametrically modulated the AX and 
BY regressors with trial-wise and mean-corrected prediction errors derived from a standard 
reinforcement learning model. Linear contrasts of regression coefficients of A vs. B (stimulus 
response), BY vs. AX (prediction error modulator), and Y vs. X (stimulus response) were 
computed at the single-participant level and then taken to group-level analyses where we used 
one-sample t-tests or correlations with participant-specific degree of blocking in the social or 
individual domain. 
Results & Conclusions 
We observed learning and blocking not only in the individual but also in the social condition as 
evidenced by a significantly higher number of reward key presses for A and Y stimuli as 
compared to B and X stimuli. Moreover, for both conditions we found individual differences in 
the degree of blocking and these differences were correlated between the individual and social 
condition. Despite this similarity on the behavioral level we found a preferential role for the 
relatively more dorsal part of the PFC for social learning and blocking: we found that activity in 
the mPFC was stronger for reward-predicting stimuli than for neutral stimuli (A vs. B) and that 
this activity increased with the degree of behavioral social blocking (Y vs. X). Thus, within 
mPFC, similar subregions showed activations reflecting reward expectation and blocking in the 
social domain. Importantly, these activations in the mPFC for social learning and blocking were 
enhanced over and above those in the individual domain (which were represented in ventral 
regions of the mPFC). 
Additionally, we found that in the BY conditions, reward key presses gradually 
increased, but that there was only a very small increase in reward key presses in the AX 
conditions as the reward outcome for AX was already fully predicted by the pretrained A stimuli.  
Consequently, the reward outcome was expected to generate a sizeable prediction error in early 
BY trials. As learning progressed from trial to trial, the reward outcome was expected to elicit a 
gradually decreasing prediction error in later BY trials. Activation in the dmPFC fitted the 
parametric modulator for BY compared with AX trials, better. This reflects the stronger 
decreasing prediction error responses in BY trials, specifically in the social condition.  
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Taken together, the findings suggest that the efficiency principle that applies to reward learning 
in the individual domain also applies to that in the social domain, with the mPFC playing a 
central role in implementing it. 
2.2  Study 2: Social unblocking 
Background 
Previous studies have shown that blocking can be prevented if the value (but not the identity) or 
the identity (but not the value) of the outcomes is changed (Burke et al., 2008; McDannald et al., 
2011). In contrast to blocking, changing the value or identity of the outcome results in learning 
of the second cue due to the discrepancy between the expected and the actual value or identity 
of the outcome. However, several studies (Bakal et al., 1974; Dickinson and Dearing, 1979; 
Ganesan and Pearce, 1988) have shown that changing the identity but not the value of the 
outcome can result in a similar degree of blocking. This is the so called “transreinforcer 
blocking” phenomenon.  
Transreinforcer blocking and unblocking have been studied in rats (Burke et al., 2008; 
McDannald et al., 2011; Steinberg et al., 2013) and in humans during causal learning (Le Pelley 
et al., 2005) when learning took place with rewards received by the learning individual. 
However, in real life we often learn in an environment in which others receive rewards as well. 
It is not clear whether or not social outcome shifts would block learning. More specifically, it is 
an open question how learning would take place if neither the subjective value, nor the identity 
of the outcome change, but its recipient. Changing the recipient of a reward might result in 
unblocking, or alternatively, as the value and identity of the outcome are the same, lead to 
transrecipient blocking. To address this question, we developed a transrecipient variant of the 
(un)blocking paradigm in which we changed the recipient of the monetary rewards while keeping 
their subjective value unchanged across individual and social conditions.  
How we learn about social information might depend also on factors that are not related 
to the outcome itself, but to how we feel towards others and to the degree to which we experience 
similar feelings from social and individual outcomes. Thus, social learning might depend on our 
capacity to experience empathy, a relationship that has been demonstrated in recent studies 
(Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009; Rak et al., 2013; Gossen et al., 2014). We therefore assessed 
participants’ empathy and hypothesized that people high in empathy will be less sensitive to 
13 
 
Overview of the studies 
recipient changes, as they perceive the consequences of others’ outcomes similarly to the 
consequences of their own outcomes. 
Methods 
Thirty-four participants performed a blocking (see Study 1) and a transrecipient (un)blocking 
experiment in two separate sessions, on different days. Like the blocking experiment, the 
transrecipient (un)blocking experiment comprised three phases. The first, pretraining phase in 
the (un)blocking experiment was identical to the pretraining phase in the blocking experiment. 
However, the second, compound conditioning phase differed from the standard blocking 
experiment. Here, the reward recipient was changed when the pretrained stimuli A were 
presented in compound with stimuli X. In the social (un)blocking condition a AINDIVIDUAL 
stimulus was pretrained with a monetary outcome for the participant, but then resulted in a 
reward (of equal value) for another person when presented with a second stimulus during 
compound conditioning (AXSOCIAL). Conversely, in the individual (un)blocking condition 
pretrained rewards were received by another person (ASOCIAL) and the recipient changed to the 
participant in the compound phase (AXINDIVIDUAL). To keep the (un)blocking experiment as 
similar as possible to the blocking experiment, there were also rewarded BY control conditions, 
although they were not analyzed further. In these conditions, after participants had learned that 
control stimulus B predicted no reward for one recipient (e.g. individual), the presentation of 
stimuli B and Y in compound was followed by reward for the other recipient (e.g. social). As in 
the blocking experiment, in the third phase, X and Y stimuli were presented alone in unrewarded 
test trials. Thus, other than the change of reward recipient in the compound conditioning phase, 
the transrecipient (un)blocking experiment was identical to the blocking experiment with respect 
to trial structure and trial number. After completion of the experiment, we assessed participants’ 
trait empathy (Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI); Davis, 1983) and prosociality (Caprara et 
al., 2005). 
Results & Conclusions 
When including all subjects, irrespective of their behavior in the blocking experiment, we 
observed that stimulus X was unblocked from learning when an individual reward outcome 
changed to a social reward outcome, as participants showed increased reward-expecting button 
presses for stimulus X in the (un)blocking experiment as compared with the blocked stimulus X 
in the standard blocking experiment. By contrast, when a social reward outcome changed to 
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individual reward our data indicate a transrecipient blocking effect as responses to stimulus X in 
the unblocking experiment do not differ significantly from the responses to stimulus X in the 
blocking experiment.  
When only investigating participants who showed blocking in the blocking experiment, 
we observed unblocking effects for both the individual and social conditions and these 
unblocking effects were correlated between conditions. Moreover, we found empathic concern 
and prosociality to be negatively correlated with the degree of unblocking in both the individual 
and social condition, indicating that participants with less empathic concern and prosociality 
showed more unblocking. Taken together, our findings suggest that value-matched learning is 
sensitive to the reward recipient and that individual differences in unblocking may relate to social 
traits. 
2.3  Study 3: Brain connectivity and individual differences in honesty 
Background 
Decisions concerning honesty are one of the most common moral decisions. As with many other 
moral decisions, humans show profound individual differences in their decisions about honesty. 
These differences are reflected for example in personality traits that determine how individuals 
will behave when telling the truth is costly (Gibson et al., 2013). Protected values (Baron and 
Spranca, 1997) represent such a personality trait. They can be thought of as principles that shield 
moral decisions against consideration of economic and other consequences. Recent 
neuroimaging studies have identified a network of brain regions in the PFC that are involved in 
decisions concerning honesty (Sip et al., 2008; Abe, 2009). However, it is not clear how these 
brain regions dynamically communicate with each other in response to variations in the cost of 
telling the truth and whether these communications depend on individual differences in protected 
values.  
To address these questions we used fMRI to measure brain activations while participants 
made decisions concerning truthfulness. It is likely that complex behavioral processes, which 
depend on personality trait and situational costs, are not reflected by activity of a single brain 
region, but by dynamic changes in the connectivity among different brain regions. Specifically, 
we hypothesized that individuals with high protected values may exhibit a specific connectivity 
pattern that protects them against the lure of economic incentives when the costs of telling the 
truth are high. Our experimental design also allowed us to address a central question in the study 
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of morality, namely, the extent to which moral and non-moral decision making relies on similar 
versus different neural mechanisms (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Hauser, 2006). We hypothesized 
that particularly individuals high in protected values tap into a specific domain. 
Methods 
Thirty-two participants were placed in the situation of an imaginary chief executive officer 
(CEO) who had to announce the company’s earnings. This setup parallels a real-life conflict that 
CEOs face, as their variable compensation is often tied to stock price performance, which, in 
turn, depends on the earnings they announce. Thus, despite knowing that it is ethically wrong, 
the CEO has economic incentives to behave dishonestly and boost earnings in order to increase 
his or her payout. Importantly, the CEOs’ preferences for telling the truth should decrease as the 
costs of telling the truth increase.  
Our experimental design aimed to create a comparable situation by varying the economic 
cost of truthfulness, which in turn allowed participants to trade off economic with moral 
incentives. Thus, in each trial of the moral task, participants had to choose whether to honestly 
announce true earnings or to lie and falsely report higher earnings. Importantly, false reports led 
to a high, fixed payoff, whereas truthful reports led to lower actual payoffs, which were varied 
parametrically from trial to trial. Moreover, we included control tasks with comparable trade-off 
situations that did not contain a moral aspect. In the valuation task participants chose between 
two projects to invest in, where one of the options yielded a higher profit than the other one. In 
the effort task, participants had to choose how much work to invest as a CEO, such that one 
option yielded a higher profit but required more work than the other option. 
In each trial of each task, participants first saw the variable, economically less beneficial 
option followed by the constant, economically more beneficial but false or more effortful option. 
The second, constant option was presented together with the first option during which 
participants had to indicate their choice. The cost of choosing the first option varied between 0 
and 4 CHF. Both task type and payoff levels were randomly intermixed across trials during the 
experiment. After scanning, we assessed to what extent participants treated truthfulness as a 
protected value and felt committed to telling the truth with a questionnaire consisting of two 
subscales (direct and indirect protected values) as described previously (Tanner et al., 2009; 
Gibson et al., 2013). 
fMRI data processing and statistical analyses were carried out using SPM8. Data 
preprocessing consisted of realignment, coregistration, segmentation, spatial normalization and 
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smoothing. The GLM identified brain regions in which activity correlated with cost-level by 
using the following set of regressors: presentation of first Truthtelling option, presentation of 
first Valuation option, and presentation of first Effort option. For each of the regressors we 
included a parametric modulator capturing the variable cost-level. Main effects for cost were 
computed on the single-subject level by performing separate t-tests for each parametric 
modulator. The resulting contrast images were taken up to the group-level where we used 
correlations with participant-specific percentage of truthtelling (or low value project/effort 
chosen) and protected values. Further, we used psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analyses 
(Friston et al., 1997) to test for coupling differences due to variations in protected values. For 
this analysis we adapted the first GLM and computed a first-level model in which we defined 
separate regressors depending on cost. With the average time course extracted from voxels in 
the dlPFC and dmPFC as physiological regressor, we performed a first-level model with the 
cost-level as a psychological regressor (high vs. low cost), and a psycho-physiological 
interaction (PPI) regressor. We then used the PPI regressor to perform a second-level correlation 
analysis with individual protected values. 
Results & Conclusions 
Participants showed a wide variation in their choices, with some participants choosing to tell the 
truth in all trials and others doing so in very few trials. We observed an interaction between the 
strength of participants’ direct protected values and economic costs of truthfulness suggesting 
that, when economic costs of truthfulness were high, participants with stronger protected values 
chose the truthful option more often, compared with participants with weaker protected values. 
In the two control tasks we found no interaction effect that followed such a pattern, indicating 
that high protected values reduced participants’ willingness to trade off specifically moral values 
rather than non-moral values against economic costs.  
On the neural level we found that coding the cost of honesty increased with the individual 
degree of honesty in the dlPFC and dmPFC. In other words, with increasing cost of telling the 
truth participants showed stronger parametric cost-related activation in the dlPFC and dmPFC 
the more often they made honest decisions. When testing for specificity we observed no 
significant activation specific for the honesty task. This finding is in line with the domain-general 
notion that cost coding in the dlPFC and dmPFC is related to the individual propensity of 
incurring any kind of costs, rather than specifically to the propensity of incurring economic costs 
for moral benefits. 
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As our behavioral analyses indicated that higher protected values support honest decisions when 
the cost of telling the truth increases, we investigated whether protected values influence the 
interaction of other regions with the dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal regions that code 
costs as a function of individual honesty. We found that functional connectivity between the 
dlPFC and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as well as between the dmPFC and the IFG, differed 
significantly as a function of cost-level and protected values. More specifically, both regions 
showed stronger functional connectivity with the IFG in high cost conditions, compared with 
low-cost conditions, as protected values increased. Moreover, cost-level dependent connectivity 
between dlPFC and IFG related more strongly to protected values in the honesty task than in the 
other two tasks. Thus, protected values appear to exert their effects on moral decision making 
particularly via a connection between the dlPFC and the IFG. Taken together, our results provide 
the first evidence that neural connectivity patterns during decisions involving honesty are 
modulated by individual differences in protected values.  
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3 General Discussion 
3.1  Study 1 
The first study revealed that the efficiency principle represented by the blocking effect extends 
to reward learning in the social domain. Importantly, the more dorsal mPFC implements this 
effect specifically in social contexts. Thus, this region contributes to other-directed reward 
learning through an efficient learning mechanism originally described in empirical studies and 
formal models of individual learning (Kamin, 1969; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). Accordingly, 
social and individual learning seem to engage neural processes that follow similar computational 
principles but are implemented in distinct areas of the brain. 
The presented results converge with reports of relatively dorsal mPFC involvement in 
other aspects of social learning. For example, Behrens et al. (2008) found that activity in the 
dmPFC correlates with errors in the predicted credibility of confederate advice. In another study, 
dmPFC activation during an inspection game was found to correlate with the degree to which 
players thought their own action influenced their opponent’s chosen strategy (Hampton et al., 
2008). Thus, activity of the dorsal mPFC can be captured particularly well with formal models 
of social learning with the unifying explanation that this region encodes social reward prediction 
errors. This is in line with the findings of previous studies which showed that the dorsal mPFC 
incorporates factors that are relevant for learning about stimuli and outcomes in social situations. 
Activity in this region has been found to be related to social value processing, other-related 
judgments, and inferring the mental states of others (Ochsner et al., 2004; Amodio and Frith, 
2006; Gilbert et al., 2006; Mitchell, 2009; Krienen et al., 2010; Fareri et al., 2012). All of these 
processes come into play when we learn in a social context. More specifically, social value 
processing, mentalizing and thinking about others constitute the motivational and cognitive 
factors that are relevant for learning about stimuli and outcomes that concern others.  
Outcomes received by others may be more abstract than one’s own outcomes (Amodio 
and Frith, 2006). In this sense, the present findings support the idea of a dorsal-ventral and 
posterior-anterior axis (Denny et al., 2012; Suzuki et al., 2012; Koritzky et al., 2013) according 
to which the more dorsal and anterior mPFC processes more abstract and complex information 
than the more ventral and posterior mPFC. From an evolutionary point of view, the results are 
consistent with the notion that the anterior part of the prefrontal cortex may have emerged as a 
new prefrontal region during primate evolution (Genovesio et al., 2014). Accordingly, the 
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complexity of social environments increased and social functions developed to a 
disproportionate degree in the later stages of primate evolution (Dunbar, 1998). It might be the 
case that these social aspects of the environment are processed in brain regions that evolved 
specifically to deal with these demands. Thus, it is tempting to speculate that the very frontal 
part of the mPFC might have evolved to serve a preferential role for learning about observed and 
socially relevant outcomes. In line with this, an interesting avenue for future research would be 
to elucidate how the efficiency principle during social learning is represented in different non-
human primates and whether it can be mapped onto the development of the anterior mPFC. 
There have also been reports of other-relevant learning processes in the vmPFC (Burke 
et al., 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012). One possibility worthy of further study is that these ventral 
regions are engaged when other-relevant learning has a direct benefit (instrumental value) for 
the observing individual (Burke et al., 2010). In contrast to that study, the observation of others’ 
rewards had comparatively little instrumental value in our study. Thus, it remains to be 
determined what specific aspects determine whether the vmPFC contributes to learning in the 
social domain. Personal relevance or instrumental value appear to be promising candidates. 
The dmPFC activation that reflected the gradual decrease in social prediction errors in 
BY trials was more dorsal and posterior than the mPFC region, which was sensitive to social 
blocking. This suggests that different subregions of the dmPFC are engaged at different stages 
of social learning. Future research may therefore focus on the mechanisms underlying the 
development of blocking in the social domain and investigate in more detail how the 
development of the effect in the compound phase relates to its expression in the test phase.  
To conclude, the present results advance our knowledge about social learning and 
demonstrate the informative role of neuroscientific approaches, particularly in cases in which 
behavior is similar for social and individual learning, but the neural mechanisms underlying 
these two types of learning are different. By comparing social with individual learning, we can 
begin to dissociate them at the neural level and assess whether social learning is unique in terms 
of behavioral and computational mechanisms. 
3.2  Study 2 
The second study investigated the unblocking effect in a social context by using a novel 
paradigm in which the recipient of the monetary outcome changed without accompanying 
changes in subjective value or reward identity (money). We found that participants who normally 
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block redundant learning in the standard blocking paradigm show unblocking when the reward 
recipient changes. Thus, although social and individual learning follow similar learning 
principles and are associated with correlated blocking effects, humans remain sensitive to who 
receives reward, and they track value-preserving recipient changes by showing unblocking. 
 When investigating the behavior of all participants, we observed unblocking for the 
social but not the individual condition, suggesting that unblocking occurs preferentially when 
individual rewards change to socially relevant rewards. This finding seems to contradict previous 
work showing a bias toward a reliance on individual information, at least when individual 
information competes with social information (Eriksson and Strimling, 2009; Morgan et al., 
2012). A bias favoring individual information would predict that participants should rely more 
on individual cues and outcomes when the outcome changes from individual to social. Thus, if 
they were more sensitive to learning from individual information participants should have shown 
unblocking when reward receipt changed from social to individual and blocking when receipt 
changed in the reverse direction. It is conceivable that the degree of reliance on individual 
information depends on the degree of competition between individual and social information but 
future research is needed to elucidate this possibility. 
Interestingly, lower scores in empathy and prosociality were associated with greater 
unblocking effects, suggesting that less empathic and prosocial individuals are more sensitive to 
who actually receives rewards. In other words, more empathic concern leads individuals to treat 
others’ rewards more similarly to their own and higher selfishness leads to increased 
differentiation between rewards received by self and other. This interpretation is supported by 
previous research that has linked empathy to altruism (Batson et al., 1991, 2003) and sharing 
behaviors (Edele et al., 2013). Our empathy finding should be interpreted with caution, however, 
since we only find a correlation with the empathic concern subscales of the IRI. In particular, 
our initial hypothesis would predict that also the perspective taking subscale should relate to 
unblocking effects. Empathy is currently thought of as a multidimensional concept, involving a 
cognitive and an affective component (Davis, 1983; Decety and Lamm, 2006). While 
perspective-taking represents the cognitive aspect, empathic concern reflects the affective aspect 
of empathy. Thus, our data seem to indicate that not understanding others’ perspective but the 
emotional reaction to others’ needs and welfare accounts for differences in the degree of 
unblocking in a social context. The findings of the second study might also have implications 
that go beyond social learning. Specifically, whether the recipient of outcomes is exchangeable 
during learning might influence any kind of decision with social outcomes. For example, 
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individuals might more strongly follow moral principles that increase others’ welfare because 
they learn about others’ outcomes as if they were their own. Thus, individual differences in social 
decision making might depend largely on how we learn about social outcomes in the first place, 
which in turn may reflect how empathic we are. 
3.3  Study 3 
In the third study we investigated how individual differences in behavior and protected values 
are represented in the brain, particularly during moral decisions involving honesty. Specifically, 
we revealed how functional coupling between prefrontal regions changes as a function of 
honesty costs and protected values. We found that in high, compared with low-cost situations, 
the dlPFC and dmPFC show stronger coupling with the IFG with increasing levels of protected 
values. 
Given that these regions have been consistently implicated in cognitive control and 
response inhibition (Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Aron, 2007; Carter and van 
Veen, 2007), the increased dlPFC and dmPFC responses, and their connectivity with the IFG 
might represent an active control mechanism that helps honest individuals to refrain from 
dishonest behavior, specifically when economic costs increase. These regions have also been 
found to play a crucial role during decisions involving honesty. While some studies showed that 
the dlPFC (Greene and Paxton, 2009; Abe and Greene, 2014) and dmPFC (Greene and Paxton, 
2009) are reflecting honest behavior, the majority of studies reported these regions to be 
associated primarily with deceptive behavior (Sip et al., 2008; Abe, 2009). This primary 
involvement in deceptive behavior has been taken as evidence that lying is cognitively more 
demanding and thus requires more cognitive control than telling the truth. Our results reconcile 
these discrepant findings by showing that the engagement of control regions during honesty 
decisions depends on both the decision situation and on individual differences between decision 
makers. Interestingly, recent behavioral research has shown that active self-control does indeed 
support honest behavior (Mead et al., 2009; Gino et al., 2011; Shalvi et al., 2012). Taken 
together, our data suggest that stronger protected values could be linked to stronger self-control 
mechanisms. 
Our results reveal that the connectivity in individuals with strong protected values is 
enhanced specifically when high economic costs are involved and thus strong control 
mechanisms are needed to protect the moral values. It has been proposed that protected values 
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derive from deontological decision rules that require or prohibit certain actions (Baron and 
Spranca, 1997). On a very basic level these rules might be stored as semantic knowledge, which 
is retrieved when individuals are faced with decision situations that are associated with those 
rules. Interestingly, the IFG has been implicated in semantic rule retrieval and processing 
(Bunge, 2004; Badre et al., 2005; Souza et al., 2009). Thus, it might be that the input to the 
dlPFC and dmPFC provided by the IFG represents semantic rules that help enforce honest 
behavior (although it should be kept in mind that directionality cannot be inferred from PPI 
effects). In agreement with this interpretation, a recent study has shown responses in the IFG 
when individuals refused to give up moral values in exchange for economic benefits (Berns et 
al., 2012).  
Our results pertain to the central question of whether moral decisions are represented by 
domain-specific or domain-general neural mechanisms (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Hauser, 2006). 
Our findings suggest that the correlation between cost coding in the dlPFC and dmPFC with 
individual honesty is not specific to moral trade-off situations, but represents a more general 
relation of coding the costs of a decision to individual differences in decisions that involve any 
kind of perceived trade-offs. By contrast, individual differences in protected values predict the 
strength of dlPFC-IFG connectivity specifically in the honesty task, but not in the two control 
tasks. Thus, differences that arise from individually varying protected values specifically relate 
to connectivity patterns during moral as opposed to non-moral decision making. These findings 
imply that the brain regions involved in moral decision making are not specific to moral 
decisions, but the way in which they interact with each other, as a function of cost and protected 
values, is specifically related to moral aspects of decisions.  
Previous studies mostly focused on the question of where in the brain honest decisions, 
or more generally, moral decisions (Young and Dungan, 2012) are processed. Our results 
indicate that a complete understanding of decisions involving honesty requires scientists 
interested in the neuroscience of moral behavior not only to identify single activated brain 
regions, but also to determine how brain regions dynamically interact with respect to personality 
traits and economic costs of the moral behavior. Advanced analysis methods, such as dynamic 
causal modeling, may help determine directionality of the present connectivity patterns. 
Moreover, causal methods, such as alternating current stimulation, could be used to explore 
whether the observed connectivity pattern can be changed and whether this leads to changes in 
the inter-individual variability of honesty decisions.  
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Taken together, our results provide the first evidence that neural connectivity patterns during 
decisions involving honesty are modulated by individual differences in protected values. 
Individual variability in behavior modulates cost coding in the dlPFC and dmPFC, both of which 
were similarly involved during more general, non-moral decisions. Individual differences in 
protected values modulate the dlPFC-IFG connectivity specifically during moral decision 
making. Our results thereby highlight the role of individual differences in moral attitudes and 
behavior, and provide an explanation as to why some people decide to follow a moral principle 
whereas others do not. 
3.4  General Conclusions 
Many current models of brain function are built on commonalities across individuals and unique 
activity patterns are often considered as noise (Thompson-Schill et al., 2005; Van Horn et al., 
2008). The studies presented in this thesis show how the analysis of individual differences can 
provide useful insights into the behavioral and neural mechanisms of social learning and moral 
decision making. Our findings have several notable implications. First, the results demonstrate 
that individual differences exist and are large. For example, study 1 showed great variability in 
the degree of blocking. Similarly, in study 3 some subjects almost always lied, while others 
always told the truth. Second, individual differences pervade mental functions. This was 
demonstrated for instance in study 1, where we found correlated blocking effects for individual 
and social learning. Third, the investigation of individual trait differences can reveal 
psychological factors that lead to individual differences in behavior. For instance, in study 2 
empathy scores predicted the degree of unblocking, suggesting that the degree of social 
transrecipient blocking or unblocking depends on the ability to share feelings experienced by 
self and other. Fourth, individual differences in social behavior are consistently expressed in the 
prefrontal cortex. This was illustrated in study 3, where prefrontal connectivity predicted 
individual differences in moral disposition and in study 1, which revealed that individual 
differences in social blocking corresponded with differences in mPFC activation. Given that the 
prefrontal cortex is connected to most cortical and subcortical structures and targets main sources 
of neurotransmitter systems in the basal forebrain and brainstem (Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Pandya 
and Yeterian, 1990), it seems that it is particularly well suited to express individual differences 
in social behavior. Together, our findings demonstrate that the study of individual differences 
leads to a more comprehensive understanding of the behavioral and neural underpinnings in 
24 
 
General Discussion 
social learning and moral decision making and imply that taking variability into account allows 
more precise predictions about social behavior. 
The study of individual differences in the domain of social learning and moral decision 
making is also relevant for improving our understanding of various psychiatric disorders that 
involve abnormal social behavior, such as schizophrenia, autism, and psychopathy. As many of 
the psychiatric diseases are on a continuum with variability in the healthy population we could 
understand disorders, in part, through understanding normal individual differences. For example, 
schizophrenic patients show reduced blocking, suggesting that prediction error processing is 
different in these patients (Jones et al., 1997; Fletcher and Frith, 2009). However, so far, studies 
have focused on altered blocking mechanisms in the context of individual learning (Oades et al., 
1996; Jones et al., 1997; Bender et al., 2001). Given that schizophrenia patients show various 
deficits in the social domain (Couture et al., 2006; Penn et al., 2008) it could be illuminating to 
investigate the blocking effect in these patients also with respect to social outcomes. This could 
be helpful for tracing impairments in social functioning and relating the deficits to specific stages 
of the disorder. Further, there might be differences between the various psychiatric disorders that 
involve social deficits. For example, it can be hypothesized that schizophrenia patients do show 
diminished blocking in both the individual and social domain, but autistic patients exhibit 
reduced blocking only in the social domain.  
The findings of the third chapter also make suggestions for the study of extreme cases 
of immoral behavior, as seen in psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder. Our findings 
point out the relevance of studying prefrontal connectivity, as individual differences in prefrontal 
coupling might reflect patterns that are responsible for predisposing some individuals to 
pathological moral behavior. Specifically, psychopaths might be more sensitive to costs and 
exhibit weak protected values, which might explain the high levels of deceptive behavior 
observed in psychopaths (Hare, 1998). On the neural level, the present results would suggest that 
psychopaths, as compared with healthy controls show reduced connectivity with the IFG when 
the costs of telling the truth are high. 
In conclusion, our findings imply that the study of individual differences in social 
learning and moral decision making can inform other fields that investigate abnormal social 
behavior and suggest that for some research questions inter-individual variability should be 
treated as data, and not as noise (Kosslyn et al., 2002; Thompson-Schill et al., 2005). 
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Table S1. Trial types and number of trials used in each phase 
Phase 
Social condition Individual condition 
Trial type 
Number 
of trials 
Trial type 
Number 
of trials 
Pretraining 
ASOCIAL + 
BSOCIAL - 
20 
20 
AINDIVIDUAL + 
BINDIVIDUAL - 
20 
20 
Compound 
conditioning 
ASOCIAL + 
BSOCIAL - 
AXSOCIAL + 
BYSOCIAL + 
CZSOCIAL - 
14 
14 
24 
24 
12 
AINDIVIDUAL + 
BINDIVIDUAL - 
AXINDIVIDUAL + 
BYINDIVIDUAL+ 
CZINDIVIDUAL - 
14 
14 
24 
24 
12 
Test 
ASOCIAL + 
BSOCIAL - 
AXSOCIAL + 
BYSOCIAL + 
CZSOCIAL - 
XSOCIAL - 
YSOCIAL - 
14 
14 
24 
24 
12 
14 
14 
AINDIVIDUAL + 
BINDIVIDUAL - 
AXINDIVIDUAL + 
BYINDIVIDUAL+ 
CZINDIVIDUAL - 
XINDIVIDUAL - 
YINDIVIDUAL - 
14 
14 
24 
24 
12 
14 
14 
 
Rewarded trials are denoted with (+) and unrewarded trials with (-). A and B refer to 
pretraining trials, AX and BY to rewarded and CZ to unrewarded compound trials, and X 
and Y to unrewarded test trials. 
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Fig. S1 Theoretically expected prediction errors for BY and AX trials. At the beginning of 
the compound conditioning phase, BY trials elicit a positive prediction error, which 
gradually decreases over time as participants learn to associate BY with the reward. In 
contrast, the prediction error in AX trials should remain constantly close to zero as A trials 
have already been associated with reward during pretraining. Thus, in AX trials during 
compound conditioning, there should be no prediction error when rewards are shown. In our 
fMRI analysis, we captured this effect by contrasting parametric modulators corresponding 
to decreasing prediction error signals in BY versus AX trials. Thus, by contrasting 
parametric modulators, we asked which brain region shows a better fit with a decreasing 
prediction error signal in BY trials than it does in AX trials. 
 
 
 
  
48 
 
Appendix  
 
 
Fig. S2 Activity in vmPFC reflects expectation and blocking for individual rewards. 
A, vmPFC responses were higher to reward-predicting A stimuli as compared to neutral B 
stimuli (-4, 40, -6; p < 0.05, FWE small-volume corrected). Contrast estimates (inset) show 
vmPFC responses to A and B stimuli separately. Error bars indicate SEM. B and C, 
Differences in activation responses to Y stimuli as compared to X stimuli increased in the 
vmPFC (-6, 42, -4, p < 0.05, FWE small-volume corrected) with degree of behavioral 
blocking in the individual condition. Blocking was quantified as the difference in reward-
expecting responses to non-blocked stimulus Y compared to blocked stimulus X.  
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Abstract 
Learning is usually driven by value differences between the outcomes we expect and the 
outcomes we actually receive. This can be demonstrated with the blocking effect in which a novel 
stimulus is blocked from learning when it is associated with a fully predicted outcome. However, 
learning can be unblocked if a discrepancy between expectation and outcome is introduced. It 
has been shown that discrepancies in both the value and the identity of the reward can unblock 
learning but it is unclear whether discrepancies in who actually receives a reward can do so as 
well. Here, we employed social variants of the unblocking and blocking experiments to assess 
learning driven by changes in the reward recipient. Participants learned to associate distinct 
visual cues with value-matched monetary rewards that they or another person received. 
Subsequently, these cues were compounded with novel visual cues. The reward recipient of the 
compound trials remained the same as before in the blocking experiment but changed in the 
unblocking experiment. We found that participants who normally block redundant learning in 
the standard blocking paradigm show unblocking when the reward recipient changes. Moreover, 
the degree of recipient-specific unblocking was higher in less empathic and less prosocial 
participants. Thus, our findings suggest that value-matched learning is sensitive to the reward 
recipient and that individual differences in unblocking may relate to social traits. 
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Introduction 
While early theories of classical conditioning assumed that the temporal contiguity between 
stimuli and reward drives learning (Pavlov, 1927), modern learning theories highlight that the 
discrepancy between the actual and predicted outcome is critical for learning (Rescorla and 
Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce and Hall, 1980). This is clearly demonstrated by the 
blocking effect (Kamin, 1969). In the blocking paradigm, a stimulus is paired with an outcome 
whose occurrence is already predicted by another, previously conditioned stimulus. Although 
the stimulus is closely followed by the outcome, it is redundant and thus “blocked” from 
learning. This blocking effect occurs because the other, previously learned cue has already been 
established as a reliable predictor of the outcome and, according to learning theories, there is no 
discrepancy between the actual and predicted outcome.  
Importantly, however, blocking can be prevented if the value (but not the identity) or the 
identity (but not the value) of the outcomes is changed. In order to show this unblocking effect, 
a variation of the blocking paradigm is used in which the compound of the first and second cue 
is followed by a different quantity (Holland, 1984) or different identity (Rescorla, 1999) of the 
outcome than was predicted by the first cue. In contrast to blocking, changing the value or 
identity of the outcome can result in learning of the second cue due to the discrepancy between 
expected and obtained value or identity. However, unblocking does not always occur. Indeed, 
several studies (Bakal et al., 1974; Dickinson and Dearing, 1979; Ganesan and Pearce, 1988) 
have shown that when the identity but not the value of the outcome is changed the blocking 
effect is still present. This is the so called transreinforcer blocking phenomenon. It suggests that 
at least during some types of learning only value, as processed by a common motivational 
system, is relevant for learning, while other features such as identity are abstracted away. 
Transreinforcer blocking and unblocking have been studied in rats (Burke et al., 2008; 
McDannald et al., 2011; Steinberg et al., 2013) and in humans during causal learning (Le Pelley 
et al., 2005). These studies investigated the mechanisms of (un)blocking when learning took 
place with rewards for the learning individual. However, in real life we often learn in an 
environment that also provides outcomes for others. It is not clear whether or not social outcome 
shifts would block learning. More specifically, it is an open question how learning would take 
place if neither the subjective value, nor the identity of the outcome would change, but its 
recipient. Switching the recipient of a reward might result in unblocking, or alternatively, as the 
value and identity of the outcome are the same, lead to transrecipient blocking. To address this 
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question, we developed a transrecipient variant of the (un)blocking paradigm in which we 
changed the recipient of the monetary rewards while keeping their subjective value constant 
across individual and social conditions.  
How we learn about social information might depend also on factors that are not related 
to the outcome itself, but to the degree to which we experience similar feelings from social and 
individual outcomes. Thus, social learning might depend on our capacity to experience empathy, 
a relationship that has been demonstrated in recent studies (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009; Rak et 
al., 2013; Gossen et al., 2014). We therefore assessed participants’ empathy and hypothesized 
that people low in empathy will be more sensitive to recipient changes, as they perceive the 
consequences of others’ outcomes similarly to the consequences of their own outcomes. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants and procedure 
Thirty-four participants (15 female; aged 20.9 ± 0.4 years; range: 18-28) took part in this study. 
None of the participants had prior histories of neurological or psychiatric disorders and all had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Written informed consent was obtained from all 
participants, and the study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Canton of 
Zurich. 
All participants performed a blocking (Seid-Fatemi and Tobler, 2014) and a 
transrecipient (un)blocking experiment in two separate sessions on different days. The delay 
between the two sessions varied between two and three weeks and the order of the two 
experiments was counterbalanced between participants.  
Experimental Design 
Stimuli and Outcomes 
In both experiments we used individual and social monetary rewards. Individual rewards were 
received by the participant, social rewards by another person. Two female volunteers served as 
the other person in social outcome conditions. To ensure that the consequences of the social 
rewards were as real as those of the individual rewards we used existing persons who received 
money at the end of the experiment. Using two rather than only one volunteer served to make 
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the social conditions more engaging (i.e. more varied and less monotonous) and thereby prevent 
adaptation. The participants never met the two volunteers face-to-face, but read a brief 
description of them before the experiment began, which included their initials and information 
about their gender and age. 
Before the experiment, we determined the amount of the individual reward according to 
the social preferences of each subject. We did this to ensure that the rewards in social and 
individual conditions had the same subjective value. To achieve this, we used a variant of the 
Becker–DeGroot–Marschak method (BDM; Becker et al., 1964). Specifically, before the 
experiment, we asked subjects to indicate the amount of money (between CHF 1 and 100) that, 
if delivered to them, was as valuable as delivering CHF 60 to the other person. The amount of 
CHF 60 was chosen based on pilot studies with a separate set of subjects showing that CHF 60 
yielded affordable individual equivalence amounts (CHF 45.80 ± 1.90). The bid was then 
compared to a random number between 1 and 100 generated by the computer. If the number was 
greater than or equal to the subject’s bid, they received the indicated amount of money. If the 
number was lower than the bid, they received nothing and the other person received CHF 60. 
Thus, the procedure provided an incentive-compatible way of obtaining individual reward 
amounts that corresponded to the value of social reward amounts. The outcome of the procedure 
had no influence on the payout or the number of rewards the participants gained from the actual 
experiment. The bid was obtained before the experiment and used to set the individual reward 
amount in the experiment such that it had the same value as the social reward amount, given the 
subject’s social preferences.  
During the actual experiment the delivery of social or individual outcomes followed the 
presentation of visual stimuli (Figure 1A). All of the stimuli used were abstract colored shapes 
presented on a white background and were similar to those used in previous blocking 
experiments (Waelti et al., 2001; Tobler et al., 2006). Each trial had either a social or an 
individual outcome, never both. Different stimuli were used for each of the experiments 
(blocking and transrecipient (un)blocking) and conditions (social and individual). 
Blocking experiment 
Blocking was tested with the standard within-subject paradigm (Waelti et al., 2001; Tobler et 
al., 2006) and comprised three consecutive phases. In each of these phases, participants were 
presented with visual stimuli that were associated with social or individual outcomes (Figure 1A; 
and see Seid-Fatemi and Tobler, 2014).  
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In the first (pretraining) phase, the A (experimental) stimuli (ASOCIAL and AINDIVIDUAL) were 
paired with a social or individual reward. In contrast, the B (control) stimuli (BSOCIAL and 
BINDIVIDUAL) were not paired with a reward. Stimuli were presented 20 times each and the 
identities of the stimuli were counterbalanced across participants. Each trial started with a 4-s 
intertrial interval (ITI) that varied from 2 to 6 s (Figure 1B). Stimuli were presented for 1.5 s at 
random either to the left or the right of the fixation cross. The outcome was presented 
concurrently with the stimulus for another 1.5 s. During the presentation of any given stimulus, 
the participants were to perform a specific key press corresponding to the recipient and to the 
outcome that would follow the stimulus. In particular, upon each stimulus presentation, 
participants had to indicate whether they expected reward for self, no reward for self, reward for 
others, or no reward for others by pressing a key with the index or middle finger of their left or 
right hand. Thus, there was an individual and social reward key and an individual and social no-
reward key and participants were asked to press one of these keys in each trial. This allowed us 
to measure recipient- as well as outcome-specific learning. Condition-to-hand (individual or 
social) and key-to-reward (reward or no reward) assignments were counterbalanced across 
participants. Trials in which the participant failed to respond or responded too late were repeated 
later. Visual stimuli as well as response recordings were controlled using Cogent 2000 
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) as implemented in Matlab. 
The remaining parts of the blocking experiment were conducted in the fMRI scanner 
(data not shown here) and therefore visual stimuli were presented on a display that participants 
viewed via a mirror fitted to the top of the head coil. In the compound phase, A stimuli were 
presented together with X stimuli (XSOCIAL and XINDIVIDUAL), forming rewarded compounds. As 
a control, B stimuli were presented together with Y stimuli (YSOCIAL and YINDIVIDUAL) and also 
followed by a reward. In AX trials, the upcoming reward was predicted by the A stimuli and 
therefore should be blocked from learning. In contrast, in early BY trials, the B stimuli did not 
predict a reward and the outcome of these trials was therefore more valuable than predicted. 
Accordingly, Y stimuli, but not X stimuli, should be learned as reward-predicting stimuli. AX 
and BY trials were presented in 24 trials per condition and intermixed with 14 A and B trials per 
condition, which served to maintain the previously learned associations. We also included 
control compound trials (CZ trials) that were unrewarded (12 trials each for the social and 
individual condition). We used this trial type to prevent compound trials in general from being 
associated with reward and to ensure that participants paid attention to each of the individual 
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stimuli that constituted a compound rather than automatically associating the co-occurrence of 
any two stimuli with reward.  
In a third phase, X and Y stimuli were presented alone in unrewarded test trials. Under 
the assumption that previous learning blocks subsequent learning, the X stimuli should have 
been blocked from being associated with social or individual reward, while the Y stimuli should 
have been associated with reward. Y and X trials were presented in 14 trials each and randomly 
intermixed with A and B trials (14 trials), AX and BY trials (24 trials), and control compound 
trials (12 trials), again, to maintain previously learned associations. As before, A, AX, and BY 
trials were followed by reward in order to maintain the previously learned associations. 
Transrecipient-(un)blocking experiment 
Like the blocking experiment, the transrecipient (un)blocking experiment comprised three 
phases. The first, pretraining phase was identical to the one in the blocking experiment. 
However, the second, compound conditioning phase differed from the standard blocking 
experiment. Here, the identity of the reward recipient was changed when the pretrained stimuli 
A were presented in compound with stimuli X. In the social (un)blocking condition an 
AINDIVIDUAL stimulus was pretrained with a monetary outcome for the participant, but then 
resulted in a reward (of equal value) for another person when presented with a second stimulus 
during compound conditioning (AXSOCIAL). Conversely, in the individual (un)blocking condition 
pretrained rewards were received by another person (ASOCIAL) and the recipient switched to the 
participant in the compound phase (AXINDIVIDUAL) (Figure 1A). 
 In the control condition the recipient of the outcome was changed in a similar fashion. 
After participants had learned that control stimulus B predicted no reward for one recipient (e.g. 
individual), the presentation of stimuli B and Y in compound was followed by reward for the 
other recipient (e.g. social). As in the blocking experiment, in the third phase, X and Y stimuli 
were presented alone in unrewarded test trials. Although we did not further analyze the control 
conditions (B, BY and Y) in the (un)blocking experiment, we kept them in the experiment in 
order to make the (un)blocking experiment as similar as possible to the blocking experiment. 
Thus, other than the change of reward recipient in the compound conditioning phase the 
transrecipient (un)blocking was identical to the blocking experiment with respect to trial 
structure and trial number. 
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Payment 
Participants were instructed that, at the end of the experiment, a portion of the rewards 
accumulated in correctly predicted trials would be paid out to them and the other two individuals, 
respectively. To ensure that everyone received approximately the same amount irrespective of 
their bid in the BDM, we adjusted the percentage for each participant individually. To keep them 
engaged throughout the experiment, in each trial in which participants failed to respond or 
responded too slowly, CHF 1 was deducted from their final monetary payment and the three 
participants with the highest number of correct responses received an additional payment (CHF 
20).  
Assessment of Empathy and Prosociality 
After completion of the experiment we assessed participants’ trait empathy with a questionnaire 
(Interpersonal Reactivity Index, IRI; Davis, 1983) which comprises 28 items. This 
multidimensional approach measures empathy with different subscales that assess perspective 
taking, fantasy, empathic concern and personal distress. Additionally, participants rated their 
prosociality on a 16-item scale (Caprara et al., 2005) that assessed their propensity to help, share, 
console, support, and cooperate with others.  
Data analysis 
Social and individual reward expectations were defined as the percentage of the social and 
individual reward key pressed, respectively, and were evaluated using paired t-tests and two-
way repeated-measures ANOVAs. Keypress data were arcsine-square root transformed (i.e. 
were variance-stabilized) to permit the application of parametric statistical tests. The degree of 
participant-specific behavioral blocking was calculated as the difference between recipient-
specific reward key presses for Y stimuli and those for X stimuli. Comparing the responses to Y 
with those to X stimuli is the standard approach to determining whether or not and to what degree 
blocking has taken place (Tobler et al., 2006; Eippert et al., 2012). The larger the difference, the 
stronger the blocking effect. Participants were classified as blockers if this difference was 
positive. 
To detect and quantify transrecipient (un)blocking we followed an approach used 
previously (McDannald et al., 2011) to detect transreinforcer (un)blocking. Specifically, 
responses to the X stimulus in the (un)blocking experiment were compared to responses to the 
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X stimulus in the blocking experiment. For each condition (social and individual) we compared 
the X stimuli with the same recipient. That is, in the individual condition we compared the X 
stimuli that in both experiments were followed by individual reward in AX compounds. While 
in the blocking experiment the A stimulus also predicted individual reward in pretraining trials, 
it predicted social reward in pretraining trials of the transrecipient (un)blocking experiment. In 
the social condition we used the same approach and compared the X stimuli that in both 
experiments were followed by social reward in AX compounds. Increased reward key responses 
to the X stimulus in the transrecipient (un)blocking experiment as compared to the standard 
blocking experiment indicate an unblocking effect, while similar levels of responses would 
indicate transrecipient blocking. Thus, the larger the difference, the stronger the unblocking 
effect. 
Results 
We used a within-subject design and two experiments, performed on different days, to test 
blocking and transrecipient (un)blocking effects with social and individual outcomes (Figures 
1A and 1B, see Methods). During the pre-training phase of both experiments, participants 
learned to associate one stimulus (A) with reward. In the blocking experiment the pre-trained 
association between A and reward was expected to block learning to X in the compound phase, 
but it was an open question whether blocking would also occur in the transrecipient (un)blocking 
experiment, in which during compound conditioning the recipient of the reward was changed 
from individual to social or vice versa. Lower responding would be compatible with a 
transreinforcer blocking effect. Alternatively, changing the recipient of the reward during 
compound conditioning might not block responding to X, compatible with an unblocking effect. 
As reported previously (Seid-Fatemi and Tobler, 2014), we found a blocking effect, 
measured as increased reward key pressing to Y than X stimuli in both the social (t(33) = 2.98, 
p < 0.01) and the individual (t(33) = 2.63, p < 0.05) condition of the standard blocking 
experiment. The average amount of blocking was similar for the social and individual condition 
(t(33) = 0.11, p = 0.92). However, for both conditions the degree of blocking varied across 
participants. Out of the 34 subjects, 17 (19) showed responses compatible with an individual 
(social) blocking effect, that is more key presses for individual (social) Y stimuli than 
for individual (social) X stimuli.  Moreover, across participants, the degree of blocking in the 
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social condition was correlated with the degree of blocking in the individual condition 
(R2 = 0.53, p < 0.001), suggesting a relation between social and individual blocking.  
Next, we investigated responses in the transrecipient (un)blocking experiment. Before 
testing for a transrecipient (un)blocking effect we confirmed that participants had learned the 
(previous) stimulus-outcome associations during the pretraining phase: Participants predicted 
recipient-specific reward outcomes when presented with reward-predicting A stimuli, but not 
when presented with B (control) stimuli. This resulted in a significantly higher number of reward 
key presses for A vs. B stimuli, for both social and individual conditions (social: t(33) = 12.26; 
individual: t(33) = 24.69, both p < 0.001), indicating that the participants learned to discriminate 
in an outcome- and recipient-specific manner between stimuli predicting reward and stimuli 
predicting no reward.  
To measure whether transrecipient or unblocking effects occurred, we compared 
responses to the X stimulus in the transrecipient (un)blocking experiment to the X stimulus in 
the blocking experiment. When including all subjects irrespective of their behavior in the 
blocking experiment we observed that stimulus X is unblocked when individual changes to a 
social reward outcome, as participants showed increased reward-expecting button presses for 
stimulus X in the (un)blocking experiment compared to the blocked stimulus X in the standard 
blocking experiment (Figure 2A; t(33) = 2.11, p < 0.05). By contrast, for the individual condition 
our data indicate a transrecipient blocking effect as responses to stimulus X in the unblocking 
experiment do not differ significantly from the responses to stimulus X in the blocking 
experiment (Figure 2A; t(33) = 0.73, p = 0.47). The suggested experiment-dependent difference 
in the degree of blocking reached trend-level significance (F(1,33) = 3.62; p = 0.07) when assessed 
with a condition by experiment interaction. 
As we find individual differences with respect to the occurrence of the blocking effect 
we next tested for a transrecipient (un)blocking effect depending on behavior in the blocking 
experiment. In particular, we asked whether subjects who showed blocking effects in the 
standard blocking experiment would also show reduced reward key responses to the X stimulus 
in the transrecipient (un)blocking experiment, or whether they would show increased responses 
to the X stimulus, compatible with an unblocking effect. We observed that stimulus X is 
unblocked when social valuable outcomes change to individual rewards, as participants showed 
increased reward-expecting button presses for stimulus X in the unblocking experiment 
compared to the blocked stimulus X in the standard blocking experiment (Figure 2B; t(16) = 2.13, 
p < 0.05). For the social condition we found similar unblocking effects when individual changed 
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to social rewards, albeit at a trend level (Figure 2B; t(18) = 1.92, p < 0.07). This suggests that 
participants who show blocking in the standard paradigm demonstrate unblocking when the 
reward recipient changes and this relation was confirmed in a correlation analysis. Indeed we 
found a positive correlation between the degree of blocking and the degree of unblocking for 
both the individual (R2 = 0.56, p < 0.001; when including all participants: R2 = 0.46, p < 0.001 ) 
and the social (R2 = 0.35, p < 0.005; when including all participants: R2 = 0.31, p < 0.005) 
condition. Moreover, the degree of unblocking in the individual condition was correlated with 
the degree of unblocking in the social condition (R2 = 0.81, p < 0.001; when including all 
participants: R2 = 0.69, p < 0.001). Taken together, our data indicate that participants who show 
standard blocking, exhibit an unblocking effect when the recipient of the reward is changed and 
this effect was related between the individual and social conditions. 
Finally, we asked whether individual differences in empathy or prosociality can predict 
the degree of unblocking. We found that the empathic concern scale correlated negatively with 
the degree of unblocking in both the individual (Figure 3A; R2 = 0.23; p < 0.01) and social 
condition (Figure 3B; R2 = 0.17; p < 0.05), indicating that participants with less empathic 
concern showed more unblocking. Similarly, although only at trend level, we found a negative 
correlation between prosociality and the degree of unblocking in both the individual (R2 = 0.10; 
p = 0.07) and social condition (R2 = 0.10; p = 0.07). Moreover, for the individual but not the 
social condition a negative correlation was found with the personal distress scale of the IRI 
(R2 = 0.12; p < 0.05). No significant correlations were found for the other subscales (all p > 
0.12).  
Discussion 
The present study investigated the unblocking effect in a social context by using a novel 
paradigm in which the recipient of the monetary outcome was changed without accompanying 
changes in subjective value or reward identity (money). We found that participants who normally 
block redundant learning in the standard blocking paradigm show unblocking when the reward 
recipient is changed. Thus, although social and individual learning follow similar learning 
principles and both show correlated blocking effects, participants are sensitive to who receives 
reward and track changes by showing unblocking. 
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When investigating the behavior of all participants, we observed unblocking for the social but 
not the individual condition, suggesting that unblocking occurs preferentially when individual 
rewards change to socially relevant rewards. Our finding seems to contradict previous work 
showing a bias toward a reliance on individual information (Eriksson and Strimling, 2009; 
Morgan et al., 2012). This bias would predict an opposite pattern, as participants should rely 
more on individual cues and outcomes when the outcome changes from individual to social and 
vice versa. Thus, if they were more sensitive to learning from individual information, 
participants should have shown unblocking when reward receipt changed from social to 
individual and blocking when receipt changed in the reverse direction. It is conceivable that the 
degree of reliance on individual information depends on the degree of competition between 
individual and social information but future research is needed to elucidate this possibility. 
Interestingly, lower scores in empathy and prosociality were associated with greater 
unblocking effects, suggesting that less empathic and prosocial individuals are more sensitive to 
who actually receives rewards. In other words, more empathic concern leads individuals to treat 
others’ rewards more similarly to their own and higher selfishness leads to increased 
differentiation between rewards received by self and other. This interpretation is supported by 
previous research that has linked empathy to altruism (Batson et al., 1991, 2003) and sharing 
behaviors (Edele et al., 2013).  Our empathy finding should be interpreted with caution, however, 
since we only find a correlation with the empathic concern subscales of the IRI. In particular, 
our initial hypothesis would predict that also the perspective taking subscale should relate to 
unblocking effects. Empathy is currently thought of as a multidimensional concept, involving a 
cognitive and an affective component (Davis, 1983; Decety and Lamm, 2006). While 
perspective taking represents the cognitive aspect, empathic concern reflects the affective aspect 
of empathy. Thus, our data seem to indicate that not understanding others’ perspective but the 
emotional reaction to others’ needs and welfare accounts for differences in the degree of 
unblocking in a social context. Future studies are needed to investigate this relation in greater 
detail. Taken together, our findings suggest that reward recipient unblocking occurs during social 
learning and may be related to individual variability in social traits. 
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Figure legends 
Fig. 1 Experimental design. A, Three phases of standard blocking (left) and transrecipeint 
(un)blocking (right) paradigm with monetary rewards. The individual conditions are shown as 
an example. During pretraining, participants learned to associate stimuli with the presence (+) 
or absence (-) of individual monetary outcomes. Reward-predicting A stimuli were followed by 
a monetary reward for self, but not neutral B stimuli. During compound conditioning, X and Y 
stimuli appeared together with A and B stimuli in rewarded compounds. Importantly, while in 
the standard blocking paradigm the compound stimuli predicted reward for the same recipient 
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as during previous pretraining (here individual), in the transrecipient (un)blocking paradigm 
compound stimuli predicted reward for the other recipient (here social). During the test phase, 
X and Y stimuli were presented alone and remained unrewarded. Rewarded trials are denoted 
with (+) and unrewarded trials with (-). B, Example of pretraining trials. Abstract visual stimuli 
were presented in random order, either to the left or the right of the fixation cross. Upon 
presentation of a stimulus, the participants were to perform a specific key press corresponding 
to the recipient (self or other) and to the outcome (reward or no reward) that would follow the 
stimulus. The outcome was shown together with the stimulus for another 1.5 s. The ITI varied 
between 2 and 6 s.  
 
Fig. 2 Behavioral results. A, Reward-expecting responses (quantified as percentage of key 
presses) of all subjects. In the social condition participants showed an increase in reward-
expecting responses to stimulus X in the transrecipient (un)blocking experiment compared to the 
blocked stimulus X in the standard blocking experiment, suggesting an unblocking effect when 
rewards change from individual to social. In the individual condition there was no significant 
difference between reward-expecting responses to the X stimuli when comparing the standard 
blocking with the transrecipient (un)blocking experiment. B, Reward-expecting responses of 
subjects showing blocking in the standard blocking paradigm. In both conditions participants 
showed increased reward-expecting button presses for stimulus X in the unblocking experiment 
compared to the one in the standard blocking experiment. Error bars indicate SEMs. 
 
Fig. 3 Negative correlation between the empathic concern score and the degree of unblocking. 
A and B, Across all subjects the degree of individual (A) and social (B) unblocking was higher 
with lower empathy in the empathic concern scale. Unblocking was defined as the difference 
between reward-expecting responses to stimulus X in the transrecipient (un)blocking experiment 
compared to stimulus X in the standard blocking experiment. 
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Abstract 
Individuals differ profoundly when they decide whether to tell the truth or to be dishonest. These 
individual differences can be viewed as personality traits that reflect how individuals will behave 
when truthfulness is costly. “Protected values” represent such a personality trait that denotes 
individual propensity to adhere to a principle that shields moral decisions against consideration 
of (economic) consequences. Recent neuroimaging studies have identified a network of brain 
regions that are involved in decisions concerning honesty. However, it is not clear how brain 
regions dynamically communicate with each other in response to variations in economic costs 
of truthfulness and whether these communications depend on individual personality differences. 
To investigate these processes we used functional magnetic resonance imaging and measured 
brain activations while participants decided whether to tell the truth. We found that participants 
showed stronger parametric cost coding in the dorsolateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex the 
more honest they were. Importantly, in participants with high protected values functional 
coupling between these regions and the inferior frontal gyrus was tighter in high cost conditions 
compared to low cost conditions. This finding suggests that moral personality can affect the 
deployment of control mechanisms. Furthermore, personality-dependent connectivity between 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the inferior frontal gyrus was specifically found during 
moral decisions. Our data provide novel insights into how prefrontal connectivity predicts 
individual variability in honesty and stress the importance of investigating functional 
connectivity in studies related to moral decisions about honesty. 
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Introduction 
Decisions concerning honesty are one of the most common moral decisions individuals make, 
not only in everyday situations but also in contexts that have great economic and political impact. 
As with decisions in general, decisions about honesty often require weighing the benefits of an 
option against its costs. Thus, while individuals value the mere act of telling the truth, they often 
also care about the consequences of their actions. Importantly, individuals differ in the extent to 
which they consider the consequences of honesty, which leads to individual differences in the 
tendency to tell the truth. Accordingly, individual differences in honesty are more pronounced 
when the cost of telling the truth is higher. For most individuals the benefits of telling the truth 
will outweigh the costs as long as these costs are low. However, when the costs increase, some 
individuals will no longer be willing to incur them, while others will stand by their moral 
principles and react less to the costs of doing so. 
Recent neuroimaging studies identified a network of brain regions that are involved when 
subjects make honest or dishonest decisions (for review see Sip et al., 2008; Abe, 2011). In spite 
of the variety of different experimental paradigms used, such as instructed lying (Spence et al., 
2001; Ganis et al., 2003; Langleben et al., 2005; Abe et al., 2006) or spontaneous lying 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Greene and Paxton, 2009; Abe and Greene, 2014), the results 
consistently revealed contributions of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), the dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) as well as the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) and the inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG) (Sip et al., 2008; Abe, 2009). Most of the studies found these regions to be 
activated when individuals engaged in dishonest behavior as compared with non-deceptive 
control behavior (Sip et al., 2008; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Abe, 2011). Others observed these 
regions to be activated when participants voluntarily told the truth as compared to a control 
condition in which they had no other choice than telling the truth (Sip et al., 2010), particularly 
in those participants who lied in most trials (Greene and Paxton, 2009).  
So far, studies looked primarily at the neural activations underlying honesty in group 
analyses, without directly considering individual differences in the propensity to tell the truth. 
To date, only one study has explored the neural mechanisms underlying individual differences 
in spontaneous dishonest behavior. Abe and Greene (2014) found that individuals with stronger 
nucleus accumbens responses to anticipated reward show higher levels of dishonest behavior 
and exhibit greater dlPFC activation when refraining from dishonest behavior. While this study 
72 
 
Appendix  
provides important insights in how the lure of economic incentives influences truthful decisions 
it is an open question how protection against that lure by strong moral principles is achieved by 
the brain. Similar to a personality dimension, individuals differ in the degree to which principles 
guide their moral decisions and these differences are captured by the notion of “protected values” 
(Baron and Spranca, 1997). More specifically, it has been shown that protected values shield 
honest decisions against economic considerations, specifically when the costs of truthfulness are 
high (Gibson et al., 2013). While protected values have been studied on the behavioral level and 
captured with formal economic models, it is not clear how individual differences in protected 
values and their impact on honesty are expressed in the brain.  
To address these questions we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
measure brain activations while participants made decisions concerning truthfulness. First, by 
varying the cost of truthfulness we were able to identify brain regions that capture individual 
differences in the propensity to tell the truth as a function of variations in the economic costs of 
doing so. Second, by measuring participants’ protected values we were able to characterize the 
neural mechanisms by which protected values impact behavior. Given that truthfulness decisions 
depend on several variables, such as personality trait and situational costs, it is likely that they 
are not implemented by a single brain region, but by dynamic changes in the connectivity among 
different brain regions. Specifically, we hypothesized that individuals with high protected values 
exhibit a specific prefrontal connectivity pattern that helps them to protect their moral values 
against the lure of economic incentives when the costs of truthfulness are high. Third, our 
experimental design also allowed us to address a central question in the study of morality, 
namely the extent to which moral and non-moral decision making relies on similar or different 
neural mechanisms. While it has been argued that moral decision making relies on common 
(“domain-general”) rather than particular (“domain-specific”) neural mechanisms (Greene and 
Haidt, 2002; Tobler et al., 2008; Shenhav and Greene, 2010), there have also been proposals that 
morality forms a domain of its own (Hauser, 2006). If so, we hypothesized that particularly 
individuals high in protected values should tap into this specific domain and prefrontal 
connectivity should express it. 
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Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-two subjects (14 female; aged 22.0 ± 0.5 years; range: 18-28) took part in the experiment. 
None of them had prior histories of neurological or psychiatric disorders and all had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the 
Canton of Zurich, and all subjects provided informed consent. 
Experimental Design 
Task instructions and payment 
Participants were first asked to read the instructions and answer control questions in order to 
ensure that they understood the tasks and the rules of the experiment. Before entering the scanner 
the participants completed a series of practice trials. In the scanner participants performed the 
truthtelling task and two control tasks (the valuation and the effort task) that were matched to 
the truthtelling task in terms of potential earnings and costs but did not contain a moral 
component. Throughout the experiment, participants were placed in the situation of an imaginary 
CEO who had to make various incentivized decisions. Participants received a fixed basic 
payment of CHF 25 and a variable additional payment that corresponded to the summed earnings 
from five randomly selected trials per task and was determined with the actual decisions made 
in these trials. The average variable payment was CHF 69.60. 
In each trial of the truthtelling task the participants had to announce the company’s earnings per 
share for the previous quarter.  The participants were informed that the variable component of 
their payment as a CEO would be higher if they announced higher earnings. They were also told 
that the market and the shareholders anticipated earnings of 35 cents per share, but that the true 
earnings were 31 cents per share. Accordingly, participants could either announce 31 cents per 
share at an economic cost to them (see below) or announce earnings of 35 cents per share while 
remaining within legal accounting limits. Thus, participants had to choose whether to honestly 
announce true earnings or to lie and falsely report higher earnings. Importantly, false reports led 
to higher, whereas truthful reports led to lower actual payoffs for the participants, corresponding 
to a trade-off between moral and economic incentives. This setup parallels a real-life conflict 
that CEOs face, as their variable compensation is often tied to stock price performance, which 
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in turn depends on the earnings they announce. Thus, despite knowing that it is ethically wrong 
the CEO has economic incentives to behave dishonestly and boost earnings in order to increase 
his or her payout. Importantly, the CEOs’ preferences for telling the truth should decrease as the 
costs of telling the truth increase.  
The bonus to be gained from giving truthful reports varied across trials between CHF 
100,000 and CHF 500,000 (see below). The bonus to be gained from giving false reports was 
fixed to CHF 500,000. These amounts reflect the substantial monetary consequences that 
earnings management can have for CEOs of public corporations. Participants were informed that 
for their experimental payoff the CEO bonus would be converted into real money at a rate of 
CHF 100,000 = CHF 1.  
In the two control tasks, too, the decisions the participants made as a CEO affected stock 
value and therefore their compensation. In the valuation task participants chose between two 
projects to invest in. The two projects were similar in their properties but differed in their profit 
and accordingly the CEO compensation. The high value project (labelled project “XIR” in the 
task) led to a higher actual payment for the CEO (CHF 500,000) than the low value project 
(labelled “ZEM”; CHF 100,000 – CHF 500,000).  
In the effort task participants had to choose how much work to invest as a CEO. The 
participants were told that the more they worked the more the company would profit and the 
more they would earn as a CEO. Specifically, in each trial participants decided how many math 
problems to solve after the experiment outside of the scanner. They chose between solving only 
one problem or five problems, which would take five times longer than solving one problem. 
Yet, the five problems option led to a higher actual payment for the CEO (CHF 500,000) than 
the one problem option (CHF 100,000 – CHF 500,000), resulting in a trade-off between time 
and economic incentives. Please note that in all tasks and trials participants decided between a 
variable (1-5 CHF) and a fixed payoff option (5 CHF).  
Trial structure 
In each trial of each task, participants first saw the variable, economically less beneficial option 
followed by the constant, economically more beneficial but false or more effortful option. The 
payoff of the first options varied between 1 and 5 CHF whereas the second option always led to 
a fixed payoff of 5 CHF. Therefore the cost of choosing the first option varied between 0 and 4 
CHF. Both task type and payoff-levels were randomly intermixed across trials during the 
experiment. Trials were separated from each other by an intertrial interval (ITI) with mean 
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duration of 4 s, varying from 2 to 6 s (Figure 1 A). In every trial the first event consisted of the 
presentation of a cue (1 s) shown at the top of the screen that indicated which kind of task 
participants had to perform. The cue ”Announce” referred to the truthtelling task, “Perform” to 
the valuation task and “Calculate” to the effort task. The first, variable option was then shown 
for 3 s in the center of the screen. In the truthtelling task the true earning (31 cents per share) 
was presented. In the valuation task the option for the low value project and in the effort task the 
option for solving one problem was shown. Below the option the CEO compensation for that 
option was indicated together with the corresponding participant payoff in parentheses. After an 
interstimulus interval consisting of a blank screen (mean of 4 s, varying between 2 and 6 s) the 
second, constant option was presented together with the first option. The second option was the 
false report (35 cents per share) in the truthtelling task, the high value project in the valuation 
task and the option for performing five calculations in the effort task.  
Participants were asked to make up their mind already during the presentation of the first 
option. This was possible as only the first option varied across trials whereas the second option 
remained constant. The decision was conveyed during the presentation of the second option. To 
prevent motor preparation during presentation of the first option the two options were presented 
randomly either on the left or the right side of the screen during the response phase. Participants 
had 2 s to indicate their choice by performing a button press. When subjects pressed a button, 
the color of the written text on the screen changed from white to yellow to indicate that a response 
had been recorded. To keep them engaged throughout the task, in each trial in which participants 
failed to respond or responded too slowly, CHF 1 was deducted from their final monetary 
payment. These trials were repeated later. On average the percentage of trials missed by 
participants was 1.5% ± 0.6% (mean ± SEM; range 0 - 16%) with no significant difference 
between the tasks (F(1,32) = 0.35, p = 0.70). Over the course of the experiment, each participant 
completed 75 truthtelling trials, 75 valuation trials and 75 effort trials. Each of the five payoff 
levels was presented 15 times per task. Stimulus presentation and response recording were 
controlled using Cogent 2000 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) 
as implemented in Matlab. 
Measurement of Protected Values  
After scanning we assessed to which extent participants treated truthfulness as a protected value 
and felt committed to telling the truth as described previously (Tanner et al., 2009; Gibson et al., 
2013). The questionnaire contained two subscales which measure protected values from two 
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different angles. The direct subscale assesses how reluctant participants are to sacrifice the value 
of telling the truth in the specific context of a hypothetical CEO’s decisions regarding the 
reporting of earnings. For example participants indicate how strongly they agree with the 
statement that one should not sacrifice truthfulness, no matter what the (material or other) 
benefits are. By contrast, the indirect subscale examines how participants evaluate the decisions 
of others by assessing their subjective emotional reactions to violations of honesty by a 
hypothetical CEO who reports company earnings. For instance, participants indicate how 
blameworthy it is in their opinion when CEO’s modify earnings reports. We were able to 
construct three indices of protected values, one based on the direct, the second based on the 
indirect subscale and the third based on the mean of the two subscales. The indices took a value 
between 0 (for an individual with no protected values) and 6 (for an individual with maximum 
protected values). 
Behavioral analysis 
The effect of protected values on choice behavior was analyzed using a series of logistic 
regression analyses. For each of the analyses, the dependent variable corresponded to the 
decision in a given trial. This was coded as a binary variable that took on the value of 1 if 
participants chose the honest (low effort or low value) option, and the value of 0 if participants 
chose the dishonest (high effort or high value) option. The independent variables (regressors) in 
the model included either cost-level, protected values or their interaction (each of the three 
protected value subscales – direct, indirect, and their mean – entered the models separately), 
while controlling for gender and age.  
fMRI Data Acquisition 
fMRI was performed on a Philips Achieva 3T whole-body scanner equipped with an eight-
channel head coil (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands) at the Laboratory for Social 
and Neural Systems Research, University of Zurich. We acquired gradient-echo T2*-weighted 
echoplanar images (EPIs) with blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast (slices/volume, 
37; repetition time, 2 s). Participants each completed five sessions of the experiment in the 
scanner, with short breaks between each session. 315-360 volumes were collected per session 
(the variation was due to individual differences in the number of repeated trials) along with 5 
“dummy” volumes at the start of each session to allow for magnetization to stabilize to a steady 
state. Scan onset times varied randomly relative to stimulus onset times. Volumes were acquired 
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at a 15° tilt to the anterior commissure-posterior commissure line, rostral > caudal. Imaging 
parameters were the following: echo time, 30 ms; field-of-view, 220 mm; in-plane resolution, 
2.75 mm; slice thickness, 3 mm; interslice gap, 0.5 mm. A T1-weighted structural image was 
also acquired for each participant. These high-resolution T1-weighted structural scans were 
coregistered to their mean EPIs and averaged to permit anatomical localization of the functional 
activations at the group level. 
fMRI Data Analysis 
fMRI data processing and statistical analyses were carried out using statistical parametric 
mapping (SPM8; Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). Data 
preprocessing consisted of realignment, coregistration, segmentation, spatial normalization 
using the DARTEL toolbox and smoothing using a Gaussian kernel with a full width at half 
maximum of 10 mm.  
The general linear model (GLM) identified brain regions in which activity correlated 
with cost-level. This GLM used the following set of regressors: Presentation of first Truthtelling 
option, Presentation of first Valuation option, and Presentation of first Effort option. All of these 
regressors were defined irrespective of actual decisions and modeled as stick functions with 
duration of 0s. For each of the regressors we included a parametric modulator capturing the 
variable cost-level. We also included regressors of no interest consisting of the onsets of decision 
time and the missed trials for each task. Finally, participant-specific movement parameters 
(three regressors for rotation and three for translation) were modeled, also as regressors of no 
interest. All regressors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function. 
Main effects for cost of truthtelling, cost of valuation and cost of effort were computed on the 
single-subject level by performing separate t-tests for each parametric modulator. The resulting 
contrast images were taken up to the group-level where we used correlations with participant-
specific percentage of truthtelling (or low value project/effort chosen) and protected values. 
We used psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analyses (Friston et al., 1997) to test for 
coupling differences due to variations in protected values. For this analysis we adapted the first 
GLM and computed a first-level model in which we defined separate regressors depending on 
cost. Specifically, for each of the tasks the model included a regressor that captured no (cost-
level 0), low (cost-level 1 and 2) and high (cost-level 3 and 4) cost conditions. For each subject, 
the average time course was extracted from voxels in the dlPFC and dmPFC in which activity 
for cost of truthtelling correlated with percent truthtelling. With this time course as physiological 
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regressor, we performed a first-level model with the cost-level as a psychological regressor (high 
vs. low cost), and a psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) regressor. We then used the PPI 
regressor to perform a second-level correlation analysis with individual protected values. 
Correction for multiple comparisons was performed in the whole brain at the cluster-
level (p < 0.05, cluster-inducing threshold: p < 0.005). Moreover, to interrogate some of the 
findings in more detail we used small-volume correction in regions of interest that were 
identified in independent, preceding whole-brain-corrected analyses. 
Results 
Behavioral results 
Choice behavior irrespective of protected values 
Our experimental design aimed to create trade-offs between moral and economic motives. In 
particular, we chose a trade-off situation that CEOs actually face in real life. CEO compensation 
is frequently tied to stock price performance and thereby to the company earnings CEOs 
announce. In our truthtelling task participants assumed the role of a CEO and decided whether 
to announce true earnings, which would reduce their compensation. Alternatively they could 
falsely report higher earnings which would result in a higher compensation. By contrast to the 
truthtelling task, in our effort task participants faced a trade-off situation without a moral aspect. 
They decided whether to work less, which would reduce their compensation, or to work harder 
and achieve a higher compensation. Thus, there was a non-moral trade-off between working 
more for higher payment and working less for lower payment in this control task. Importantly, 
the economically more costly option (telling the truth, choosing to work less) involved the same 
variable compensation reductions (i.e. economic costs) in both tasks. In the valuation task 
participants decided whether to choose a low-value project that would reduce their compensation 
or a high-value project that would result in a higher compensation. There was no trade-off in this 
control task as there were no costs for choosing the high value option. However, the variable 
economic value difference between the two options was equivalent to that of the other two tasks. 
Thus, at equal economic stakes, one task involved a trade-off with moral values, one a trade-off 
with non-moral value and one involved no trade-off at all. 
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In the truthtelling task, participants on average told the truth in a bit less than half of the trials 
(39.8% ± 5.1% (mean ± SEM)),  and showed a wide variation in their choices with some 
participants choosing to tell the truth in all trials and others doing so in very few trials (range 6.7 
- 100%). In the effort task participants chose the low effort option with similar frequencies 
(40.1% ± 5.0%, range 0 - 93.3%) while in the valuation task they chose the low value option less 
often (18.8% ± 2.6%, range 0 - 60%). Moreover, across participants, the percentage of 
truthtelling was correlated with the percentage of low effort chosen (R2 = 0.29, p < 0.01). The 
truthtelling and the valuation task (R2 = 0.04, p = 0.26) and the effort and the valuation task 
(R2 = 0.02, p = 0.47) did not show a correlation. 
We tested whether participants’ choices differed as the economic costs of truthfulness 
changed by regressing the choices against the cost-level. This revealed significant effects of cost 
(β = -0.95 ± 0.13 (mean ± SEM), t = -7.29, p < 0.001) on truthful decisions (fewer truthful 
decisions with increasing economic costs), suggesting that at least some participants traded off 
the economic cost of telling the truth with its moral benefits. We observed similar effects for the 
two control tasks: the cost-level predicted whether or not participants chose the low value/effort 
option (valuation task: β = -1.50 ± 0.19, t = -8.06; effort task: β = -1.02 ± 0.15, t = -6.91; both p 
< 0.001). 
Protected values and their impact on choice behavior 
Participants exhibited individual differences in the direct measure of protected values, the 
indirect measure and the mean of the two subscales (direct measure: 4.1 ± 0.2 (mean ± SEM), 
range 1.8 – 6.0; indirect measure: 4.5 ± 0.2, range 2.4 – 6.0; mean score: 4.3 ± 0.2, range 2.9 – 
6.0). These values were similar to those reported in a previous study (direct measure: 3.35 ± 
1.29; indirect measure: 4.2 ± 1.1; mean score: 3.8 ± 1.03; see Gibson et al., 2013). Moreover, as 
in the previous study, the direct and the indirect measures were correlated (R2 = 0.23, p < 0.01). 
 Without taking cost level into account, logistic regressions revealed no significant 
relations between any measure of protected values and choice behavior in any of the tasks (all β 
< 0.25, t < 1.70, p > 0.09). However, higher protected values should allow participants to resist 
the temptation of sacrificing moral values for economic benefits particularly when the economic 
costs for telling the truth are high. Thus, high protected values should lead to more honest 
decisions in higher cost conditions. We assessed this hypothesis in an interaction analysis using 
the direct and indirect subscales separately and together based on the means of the two subscales.  
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In agreement with the hypothesis, we observed a positive interaction between direct protected 
values and economic costs of truthfulness (β = 0.28 ± 0.13, t = 2.15, p < 0.05). In other words, 
when economic costs of truthfulness were high participants with stronger protected values chose 
the truthful option more often compared to participants with weaker protected values. By 
contrast, no significant interactions between protected values and economic costs of truthfulness 
arose for the indirect (β = -0.10 ± 0.13, t = -0.76, p = 0.45) and the total score measure (β = 0.09 
± 0.14, t = 0.61, p = 0.54). Thus, particularly the direct measure of protected values predicted 
whether or not individuals would trade off truthfulness against the economic cost as the costs 
increased (Figure 1 B). We therefore primarily used this subscale for the analysis of the imaging 
data.  
Importantly, in the valuation and effort task, we found no interaction effect induced by 
participants higher in direct protected values choosing the more costly option more often at 
higher costs. While there was no interaction effect for the effort task (β = 0.12 ± 0.13, t = 0.92, 
p = 0.36), in the valuation task participants with high protected values chose the low value option 
less often in the zero cost condition (β = 0.31 ± 0.14, t = 2.16, p < 0.05). Note though that this 
interaction effect is quite different from that in the truthtelling task, where participants with high 
protected values chose the truthful option more often in high cost conditions. Indeed, when 
excluding the zero cost condition (and thus including only trade-off conditions, where there was 
an actual economic cost for telling the truth) the interaction effect for the valuation task 
disappeared completely (β = 0.14 ± 0.16, t = 0.88, p = 0.38) but was still present, at least at trend 
level, for the truthtelling task (β = 0.30 ± 0.16, t = 1.91, p = 0.06). Taken together, these data 
suggest that high protected values reduced participants’ willingness to trade off specifically 
moral as opposed to no-moral values against economic costs.  
In further regression analyses we also tested whether response times were related to 
protected values and cost-levels. We observed neither a main effect of cost (β = 7.49 ± 5.07, t = 
1.48, p = 0.15) or protected values (β = 13.56 ± 15.18, t = 0.89, p = 0.38) nor a cost x protected 
values interaction (β = 1.73 ± 5.79, t = 0.30, p = 0.77). Moreover, we also found no effect of 
choice on response times (β = -17.77 ± 30.79, t = -0.58, p = 0.57).  
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Neuroimaging results 
DLPFC and DMPFC code truthtelling costs with increasing propensity to be honest 
In a first step, we aimed to find a basic relation between coding the cost of telling the truth and 
the observed behavioral propensity to tell the truth, irrespective of protected values. We expected 
that cost would be differentially encoded depending on how often participants show honest 
behavior.  We therefore searched for brain areas where activation related to cost-level 
(parametric modulator) changed as a function of percent truthtelling. As a trade-off between 
moral and economic incentives arises only when at least some economic costs are incurred for 
telling the truth we performed this analysis without the zero cost condition. We found that neural 
coding of the cost of truthtelling increased with the individual percentage of truthtelling in the 
dlPFC and dmPFC (Figure 2A and B; dlPFC: -30, 56, 26; t(30) = 4.92; Figure 2C and D; dmPFC: 
-6, 16, 44; t(30) = 4.48; both p < 0.05, whole-brain FWE cluster-level corrected). In other words, 
with increasing cost of telling the truth participants show stronger activation in the dlPFC and 
dmPFC the more often they make honest decisions.  
We wondered whether the correlation of cost-related activity with the percentage of 
truthtelling would still emerge if we also accounted for individual differences in protected 
values. We therefore included protected values in the correlation analysis as a second covariate. 
Again we found stronger dlPFC and dmPFC activation with increasing cost and increasing 
percentage of truthtelling (dlPFC: -30, 56, 26; t(29) = 5.33; dmPFC -6, 20, 40; t(29) = 5.19; 
p < 0.05, both p < 0.05, whole-brain FWE cluster-level corrected).  
We next tested whether the correlations between cost-related activation and percent 
truthtelling in the dlPFC and dmPFC are specific for moral as opposed to non-moral decisions 
by comparing the truthtelling task with the two control tasks. The analysis was based on the fact 
that in all tasks participants were confronted with the same economic cost-levels when choosing 
between the truth, low value or low effort option on the one hand and the lie, high value or high 
effort option on the other hand. Thus, the only additional component in the truthtelling task was 
the moral nature of the decision made. We therefore performed a second-level correlation 
analysis in which we tested for stronger correlation of truthtelling cost-related activation with 
percent truthtelling than of valuation cost-related activation with percent low value option 
chosen and of effort cost-related activation with percent low effort option chosen. We observed 
no significant activation specific for the truthtelling task. This finding is in line with the notion 
that cost coding in the dlPFC and dmPFC is related to the individual propensity of incurring 
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costs more generally, rather than specifically to the propensity of incurring economic costs for 
moral benefits. 
DLPFC-IFG and DMPFC-IFG interactions increase with protected values 
The analysis above identified differential cost coding in the dmPFC and dlPFC in relation to 
individual differences in behavior rather than protected values. However, our behavioral 
analyses indicated that higher protected values support honest decisions as the cost of telling the 
truth increases. In a next step we therefore asked how protected values affect the brain 
specifically in high cost situations. In particular we investigated whether the dlPFC and dmPFC 
that code costs as a function of percent truthtelling change their interaction with other brain 
regions with respect to protected values. We therefore formed two first-level models with 
activity either from the dlPFC or the dmPFC region identified above as physiological regressor, 
the cost-level as a psychological regressor (high vs. low cost), and a psycho-physiological 
interaction (PPI) regressor corresponding to the product of the first two regressors. The PPI 
regressor then served for a second-level correlation analysis with protected values. We found 
that functional connectivity between the dlPFC and the IFG as well as between the dmPFC and 
the IFG differed significantly as a function of cost-level and protected values (Figure 3A; 
dlPFC: -46, 28, 30; t(30) = 4.56; Figure 3C; dmPFC: -44, 28, 28; t(30) = 5.12; p < 0.05, both whole-
brain FWE cluster-level corrected; additionally, whole-brain cluster-level corrected activation 
was found in the parietal cortex (-46, -32, 38; t(30) = 4.29)). Specifically, both regions showed 
stronger functional connectivity with the IFG in high cost conditions compared to low cost 
conditions as protected values increased (Figure 3B and D).  
We wondered whether the modulation of dlPFC-IFG and dmPFC-IFG connectivities by 
protected values would still emerge when we also accounted for individual differences in the 
percentage of truthtelling. We therefore included a second regressor with percent truthtelling as 
a covariate of no interest in the correlation analysis and again found that both dlPFC-IFG and 
dmPFC-IFG coupling increased more in high than low cost conditions as protected values 
increased (dlPFC-IFG: -46, 28, 30; t(29) = 4.86; dmPFC-IFG: -44,28,28; t(29) = 5.40, both 
p < 0.05, whole-brain FWE cluster-level corrected). 
We next tested whether the modulation of the dlPFC-IFG and dmPFC-IFG connectivity 
by protected values is specific for the truthtelling task by comparing the activity pattern with the 
other two tasks. We therefore included the two control tasks in the PPI model with the cost-
levels (high vs. low) of the valuation and effort task respectively as psychological regressor and 
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correlated the strength of connectivity with the individual differences in protected values for all 
tasks.  We found that the cost-level dependent connectivity between dlPFC and IFG related more 
strongly to protected values in the truthtelling task as compared to the other two tasks (Figure 4; 
-46, 24, 16; t(60) = 4.52; p < 0.05, whole-brain FWE cluster-level corrected). By contrast, the 
cost- and protected-value-related increase of dmPFC connectivity with the IFG was not specific 
for the truthtelling task, (p > 0.8). Thus, protected values appear to exert their effects on moral 
decision making particularly via a connection between the dlPFC and the IFG. 
Discussion 
In the present study we investigated how individual differences in behavior and protected values 
are represented in the brain particularly during moral decisions involving honesty. We 
demonstrate that the more individuals actually behave honestly the more the dlPFC and dmPFC 
are engaged by increasing economic costs of honesty. Importantly, in high compared to low cost 
situations, both the dlPFC and dmPFC show stronger coupling with the IFG with increasing 
levels of protected values. Moreover, the relation of dlPFC-IFG connectivity with individual 
differences in protected values is specific for moral decisions. These findings provide novel 
insights into how prefrontal connectivity underpins individual variability in a personality trait 
that promotes honesty.  
In line with previous behavioral research (Gibson et al., 2013) we find that personal 
factors (protected values) and situational factors (cost-level) predict whether individuals behave 
honestly. More specifically, when economic costs of truthfulness were high participants with 
stronger protected values chose the truthful option more often compared to participants with 
weaker protected values. This suggests that protected values are instrumental in driving truthful 
decisions particularly when the costs of truthfulness are higher. It should be noted, however, that 
in the current study we only find an effect with the direct measure of protected values. By 
contrast, in a previous study both the direct and indirect subscales showed a relation to behavior 
(Gibson et al., 2013). The direct measure captures the more cognitive dimension of protected 
values (Baron and Spranca, 1997), whereas the indirect measure emphasizes the emotional 
aspects and affective reactions individuals experience when they evaluate dishonest behavior 
(Tetlock et al., 2000). One obvious difference between our current study and the one conducted 
previously is that our participants completed many trials, whereas in the previous study they 
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decided only once for each cost-level. Thus, one explanation could be that it was not possible to 
capture the affective aspect with our design as emotional responses wear off more quickly than 
cognitive responses. Moreover, it should be noted that in contrast to the previous study both the 
original (effort) and the added (valuation) control tasks were presented randomly intermixed 
with the truthtelling task to prevent non-specific block effects. Yet, confronting participants with 
moral decisions in isolation could have enhanced the affective responses to the proposal of 
dishonesty for personal gain in the previous study. Thus, intermixing of tasks in our study could 
have weakened emotional reactions to the moral aspects of the truthfulness task. 
In our study, cost coding in the dlPFC and the dmPFC was related to individual 
differences in honesty. Previous research found especially the dlPFC, but also the dmPFC to 
play a crucial role during honest and dishonest behavior. For example, the dlPFC and dmPFC 
have been associated with deception during instructed and spontaneous lying (Sip et al., 2008; 
Abe, 2009, 2011), which has been taken as evidence that lying is more demanding and thus needs 
more cognitive control than telling the truth. However, the dlPFC and dmPFC also have been 
associated with honesty. Two recent studies found that individuals who are more prone to 
economic gain and exhibit high levels of dishonesty show greater dlPFC (Greene and Paxton, 
2009; Abe and Greene, 2014) and dmPFC (Greene and Paxton, 2009) engagement when making 
honest decisions. Our findings suggest a potential reconciliation of these discrepant findings. In 
particular, the dlPFC and dmPFC activity is driven by the combination of the individuals’ 
propensity to be honest and how costly honesty actually is.  
The increased dlPFC and dmPFC responses and their connectivity with the IFG might 
represent an active control mechanism that implements honest behavior and biases honest 
individuals to refrain from dishonest behavior specifically at higher economic cost. These 
regions have been consistently implicated in cognitive control and response inhibition 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Aron, 2007; Carter and van Veen, 2007). We 
note that this interpretation is different to that proposed by previous studies (Sip et al., 2008; 
Abe, 2009, 2011) which suggest that deceptive rather than honest behavior engages the control 
network. The present study differs in several ways from the ones conducted previously. First, in 
a recent study that has investigated spontaneous lying (Greene and Paxton, 2009) participants 
were given the opportunity to behave dishonestly by lying about the accuracy of their predictions 
about the outcomes of computerized coin flips. Thus, in lie trials participants had to override 
their previous prediction, which may more difficult than the lie decisions in our study. Second, 
in our study participants were explicitly told that in real life CEOs could report false earnings 
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within accounting laws. Consequently, in our experiment the default action was more likely to 
be the dishonest option. Thus, whether honesty or dishonesty requires the engagement of control 
regions might depend on which of the two represents the default action.  
It has been proposed that protected values derive from rules that prohibit certain actions 
(Baron and Spranca, 1997). On a very basic level these rules might be stored as semantic 
knowledge, which is retrieved when individuals are faced with decision situations that are 
associated with those rules. Interestingly, the IFG has been associated with semantic rule 
retrieval and processing (Bunge, 2004; Badre et al., 2005; Souza et al., 2009). Thus, the IFG 
could provide the dlPFC and dmPFC with input that represents semantic rules which biases 
participants towards honesty irrespective of consequences (although it should be kept in mind 
that directionality cannot be inferred from PPI effects). In agreement with this interpretation, a 
recent study has shown responses in the IFG when individuals refused to accept money for 
changing previously reported moral views (Berns et al., 2012). Our results reveal that the 
connectivity in individuals with strong protected values is enhanced specifically when high 
economic costs are involved and thus strong control mechanisms are needed to protect the moral 
values.  
Interestingly, individuals with low protected values exhibited increased dlPFC-IFG and 
dmPFC-IFG coupling during low cost conditions. Given the proposed role of the IFG in 
implementing honest behavior it is conceivable that the coupling biases individuals with weak 
protected values towards honesty only in situations where the costs for telling the truth are low. 
This interpretation would imply that the connectivity itself is not specific to individuals with 
strong protected values but that it is specifically engaged in strong protected value individuals 
when the economic cost and thus the temptation to switch to dishonest behavior is high. Thus, 
in all individuals the dlPFC-IFG and dmPFC-IFG coupling translates into increased honest 
behavior, but only individuals with strong protected values exhibit stronger coupling during high 
cost situations which shields their moral values against economic considerations.   
Our results re-visit the central question of whether moral decisions are represented by 
domain-specific or domain-general neural mechanisms (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Hauser, 2006). 
Our findings suggest that the correlation between cost coding in the dlPFC and dmPFC with 
individual honesty is not specific to moral trade-off situations, but represents a more general 
relation of coding the costs of any decision to individual differences in how these costs influence 
the decision. By contrast, individual differences in protected values predict the strength of 
dlPFC-IFG connectivity specifically in the honesty task, but not in the two control tasks. Thus, 
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individual differences that arise from reluctance to consider economic consequences of moral 
behavior seem to elicit specific connectivity patterns that differ from those associated with 
individual differences in decisions involving trade-offs between consequences. These findings 
imply that the brain regions involved in moral decision making are not specific to moral 
decisions, but the way they interact with each other as a function of cost and protected values is 
specifically related to moral aspects of decisions.   
The dlPFC-IFG connectivity but not the dmPFC-IFG connectivity showed specificity 
for protected values when compared with the non-moral control tasks. It has been proposed that 
the dmPFC plays a role in monitoring and specifying cognitive control, while the dlPFC is 
assumed to be responsible for the regulative function of control, that is for actually implementing 
the control signal to execute the control-demanding action (MacDonald et al., 2000; Botvinick 
et al., 2004; Botvinick, 2007; Carter and van Veen, 2007; Shenhav et al., 2013). Thus, we 
speculate that in our task the monitoring function represented by dmPFC-IFG connectivity 
relates to protected values also in the control tasks. By contrast, the implementation function 
represented by dlPFC-IFG connectivity relates to protected values only in the truthtelling but 
not in the other tasks, as only in the truthtelling task protected values predict how economic costs 
are processed. Thus, it might be that conflict monitoring driven by protected values partly also 
affects other domains of conflict, not only those involving moral aspects. By contrast, the 
implementation of control as mediated by protected values dependent dlPFC-IFG coupling plays 
a role specifically during moral decisions. By extension, personality-related moral cognition 
could be both domain-general and domain-specific depending on the specific mental function 
that is investigated.  
The interpretation mentioned above also provides an understanding on protected values 
more generally by suggesting that protected values may be tied to self-regulatory processes and 
exert their influence on behavior via control mechanisms. Interestingly, recent studies have 
shown that active self-control indeed supports honest behavior (Mead et al., 2009; Gino et al., 
2011; Shalvi et al., 2012). Taken together, our findings suggest that stronger protected values 
could be linked to stronger self-control mechanisms, a possibility that may warrant future 
research. 
In conclusion, our results provide the first evidence that neural connectivity patterns 
during decisions involving honesty are modulated by individual differences in protected values. 
Individual variability in actual behavior relates to parametric cost coding in the dlPFC and 
dmPFC, and both of these relations occurred also during more general, non-moral decisions. By 
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contrast, individual differences in protected values modulate the dlPFC-IFG connectivity 
specifically during moral decision making. Our results thereby highlight the role of individual 
differences in moral attitudes and behavior and provide an explanation why some people decide 
to follow a moral principle whereas others do not. 
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Figure legends 
Fig. 1 Experimental design and behavioral results. A, In each trial of each task, participants first 
viewed a fixation cross for a variable ITI of 2 – 6 s followed by the presentation of a cue (1 s) 
that indicated which kind of task participants had to perform. The first, variable option was then 
shown for 3 s. In the truthtelling task the true earning (31 cents per share) was presented, in the 
valuation task the option for the low value project (project ZEM) and in the effort task the option 
for solving one problem was shown. The payoff of the first options varied between 1 and 5 CHF. 
Below the option the CEO compensation was indicated together with the corresponding 
participant payoff in parentheses. After an interstimulus interval (2 - 6 s) the second, constant 
option was presented together with the first option. The second option was the false report (35 
cents per share) in the truthtelling task, the high value project in the valuation task (project XIR) 
and the option for performing five calculations in the effort task. Upon presentation of the second 
option participants had 2 s to indicate their choice by performing a button press. When subjects 
pressed a button, the color of the written text on the screen changed from white to yellow to 
indicate that a response had been recorded. B, The difference in the percentage of truthtelling 
increased as a function of cost and protected values. When economic costs of truthfulness were 
high participants with stronger protected values (upper tercile) were more honest compared to 
those with low protected values (lower tercile), suggesting that protected values are more 
important in determining truthful decisions when the costs of truthfulness are higher. Error bars 
indicate SEMs. 
 
Fig. 2 Activity in DLPFC and DMPFC reflects truthtelling costs with increasing propensity to 
be honest. A and B, DLPFC responses to the cost of truthtelling increased with the individual 
percentage of truthtelling (-30, 56, 26; t(30) = 4.92; p < 0.05, whole-brain FWE cluster-level 
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corrected). C and D, DMPFC responses to the cost of truthtelling increased with the individual 
percentage of truthtelling (-6, 16, 44; t(30) = 4.48; p < 0.05, whole-brain FWE cluster-level 
corrected). Color bars indicate z-scores. 
 
Fig. 3 DLPFC-IFG and DMPFC-IFG interactions increase with truthtelling costs and protected 
values. A, Functional connectivity between the DLPFC (seed shown as inset) and the IFG was 
increased in high compared to low cost conditions as protected values increased (-46, 28, 30; 
t(30) = 4.56; whole-brain FWE cluster-level corrected). Color bar indicates z-score.  B, 
Connectivity strength between the DLPFC and IFG plotted separately for participants with high 
and low protected values (PV) and for high and low cost conditions. Error bars indicate SEMs. 
C, Functional connectivity between the DMPFC (seed shown as inset) and the IFG was increased 
in high compared to low cost conditions as protected values increased -44, 28, 28; t(30) = 5.12; 
whole-brain FWE cluster-level corrected). Color bar indicates z-score.  D, Connectivity strength 
between the DMPFC and IFG plotted separately for participants with high and low protected 
values (PV) and for high and low cost conditions. Error bars indicate SEMs. 
 
Fig. 4 The DLPFC-IFG interaction pattern is specific for the truthtelling task. The increased 
connectivity between the DLPFC (inset) and the IFG for high compared to low cost conditions 
related more strongly to protected values in the truthtelling task as compared to the two control 
tasks (-46, 24, 16; t(60) = 4.52; p < 0.05, whole-brain FWE cluster-level corrected).  Color bar 
indicates z-score. 
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